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ABSTRACT 
As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust both federal and state military 
resources, it is important to establish a domestic disaster response plan that does not rely 
or default to a military solution.  Post-Katrina assessments highlight that the response to 
Hurricane Katrina has tarnished the DHS and FEMA’s image and trust that Americans 
have in the government’s ability to respond effectively to a disaster.   
The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted 
volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen 
Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-
Reserve.  Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at 
every level of the government.  Although many Americans are willing to serve their 
nation, many are apprehensive to serve in uniform and, specifically, in combat. The 
aftermaths of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, however, highlight the need for citizen 
involvement during domestic emergencies.   
The unconstrained and largely uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, 
the lack of a national governing body or oversight mechanism, along with the over-
exhausted and ill-equipped troops at home, clearly demonstrates the need for America to 
consider expanding the opportunities for citizen service. Enacting an emergency response 
volunteer system that is part of a national service system is the best way to involve 
Americans in homeland security.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust both federal and state military 
resources, it is important to establish a domestic disaster response plan that does not rely 
or default to a military solution.  The federal responses, or lack thereof, to large scale 
man-made and natural disasters make it easy to understand why Americans feel 
uncertainty about domestic threats.  Post-Katrina assessments highlight that the response 
to Hurricane Katrina has tarnished DHS and FEMA’s image and trust that Americans 
have in the government’s ability to respond effectively to a disaster.   
The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted 
volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen 
Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-
Reserve.  Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at 
every level of the government.  Although the National Guard and Coast Guard serve as 
default first responders, the current national security poses new challenges and threats 
that could impede a military response.   
This thesis investigates the existing volunteer-emergency response assets and 
highlights some of the inherent weaknesses of the current system. The unconstrained and 
largely uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, the lack of a national governing 
body or oversight mechanism, along with the over-exhausted and ill-equipped troops at 
home, clearly demonstrates the need for America to consider expanding the opportunities 
for citizen service.  
Therefore, following one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, “to 
emphasize the importance of first responder training and prior joint planning,” the 
Department of Homeland Security should re-organize and synchronize the volunteer 
emergency response system.  America has always witnessed a wellspring of citizen 
volunteers willing to serve their nation, however many are apprehensive to serve the 
nation in uniform and, specifically, in combat, however the aftermaths of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina highlight the need for citizen involvement during domestic 
 xvi
emergencies.  Therefore, enacting an emergency response volunteer system that is part of 
a national service system is the best way to involve Americans in homeland security.   
It is imperative that the nation realize the rising costs of homeland security and 
therefore take advantage of the semi-patriotic fervor that has inspired civilian-volunteers 
toward national service, especially since these forces are only paid when activated for a 
real-world emergency; saving not only lives, but also thousands, if not millions, of 
dollars.  A DHS-R, with a solid structure and legitimacy, could enhance the ability to 
recruit, train, and retain volunteers.   
A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves, made of properly trained 
individuals, could effectively fill the emergency response gap, especially in the absence 
of deployed National Guard and active-duty military forces.  America can- and should- 
unify the disparate volunteer organizations that are willing to assist in emergency 
disasters.  Such unity of effort would combine existing multiple resources into one 
systemic entity available to dispatch volunteers with specific training, various skill sets, 
and credentials to disasters nationwide.  Such an organization is vital for an effective and 
comprehensive national emergency response.  Developing a Department of Homeland 
Security-Reserves is critical and necessary for the overall domestic security of our nation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The real first responders are our citizens.  We can't do our job without 
them.  They are the key element. 
 — Chief Ed Plaugher, Arlington Fire Dept., 2001 
 
This thesis will provide a conceptual idea of what a Department of Homeland 
Security-Reserves could look like, given that there is a need to create such a volunteer 
organization.  For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider all people living in the 
United States as eligible candidates and not discriminate by citizenship status.  Although 
some matters deal with national security, it is assumed that, since individuals can enlist in 
the U.S. Armed Forces without legal citizenship, they should also be allowed to serve in 
certain homeland security capacities.  This thesis does not attempt to criticize or replace 
any existing organizations; it is simply a conglomeration of ideas, policies, and research. 
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
As a result of 9/11, the security of the United States is spread across a broad 
spectrum that relies on several agencies.  The National Response Plan calls on the 
Department of Defense to assist and respond to natural and man-made disasters once 
local and state resources are overwhelmed1.  The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and other Presidential Homeland Security initiatives has caused the 
Department of Defense to assume an increased role in Homeland Defense and Security 
missions.  Although active duty, reserve, and National Guard troops have always assisted 
in national emergencies and recovery efforts domestically, the current global war poses 
new challenges and threats that could impede a military response.  Well over 100,000 
National Guardsmen were activated for 9/11 for over 300 days, and during the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster, over 20,000 active-duty military and 50,000 National Guard troops were 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, 41. 
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called on to assist.2  As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust both federal and 
state military resources, it is important to establish a response plan that does not rely or 
default to a military solution.  Over 150,000 troops are in Iraq, and more than half of 
them are either Reserve or National Guard forces.3  Thus far, the dual deployments have 
not hindered emergency response efforts, but with over one-third of Mississippi and 
Louisiana National Guard troops and equipment deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, can 
other states effectively fill the emergency response gap? What about the fact that many of 
the surrounding National Guardsmen themselves may be affected by a terrorist attack, or 
that an estimated 125,000 National Guardsmen live in a hurricane path of destruction?4  
These facts highlight the importance to plan for the eventuality of a catastrophe occurring 
with only limited military capabilities being available.  The United States, specifically the 
Department of Homeland Security, cannot afford to wait for a catastrophic disaster to 
occur before taking action to circumvent the possibility of not having a DoD “safety net.” 
After 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, citizens across the nation asked, “What can I 
do?” and “How can I help?” as America witnessed a wellspring of citizen volunteerism, 
selfless service, and heroism.  This sense of service to the nation continues today as the 
Global War on Terror continues; however, American citizens are more apprehensive to 
serve the nation in uniform and, specifically, in combat.  The aftermaths of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina highlight the need for citizen involvement during domestic 
emergencies. 
The President of the United States has continually reminded Americans that 
“homeland security” is a national responsibility at the federal, state, and local levels, to 
include each individual citizen.  Therefore, securing our homeland, safety, and freedom 
requires a unity of effort in which every American has the opportunity to exercise a 
critical role of civic responsibility and participation to achieve community preparedness. 
                                                 
2 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Committee Report (Washington D.C., 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, May 2006), Chapter 12, 169. 
3 Christian Science Monitor: Katrina poses key test for stretched National Guard; Part time Soldier- 
after having served in Afghanistan and Iraq- are now called up for duty in Gulf Coast disaster, release 
date: September 2, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0902/p02s01-usmi.html accessed 
May 5, 2007.     
4 Ibid. 
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Such unity of effort should combine existing federal, state, and local resources into one 
systemic entity available to dispatch citizens with various skills nationwide in the event 
of a man-made or natural disaster. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is it necessary to form or unify a citizen volunteer reserve force to assist in 
national emergencies to mitigate the potential risks of not having sufficient DoD 
resources available?  If so, would a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves (DHS-
R), made up of properly trained U.S. citizens fill the gap to respond to national disasters 
in the absence of deployed National Guard and active duty military forces?  Would this 
solution condense the multiple and existing emergency management resources into one 
manageable and operational resource effective for decision makers to accomplish 
Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions?  If so, could such a federal 
program effectively and efficiently concentrate volunteer efforts by providing formalized 
training and standardized identification credentials to create less confusion? 
1. Assumptions 
My initial assumptions include both a supply and demand of volunteers.  Although the 
likelihood of needing such a large-scale program is higher due to the Global War on 
Terror, there is still a need for an organized volunteer response.  Additionally, there will 
still be a need for a large-scale, interstate volunteer response because of the current 
dismantled state of the National Guard.5  Lastly, there still exists a high spirit of 
volunteerism among U.S. residents.  Therefore, even if all the U.S. troops were to return 
home from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would still be a need for a Department 
of Homeland Security-Reserves.  After all, the Army has no strategic reserve ready to 
protect U.S. interests domestically, while roughly half of the National Guard’s equipment 
is in Iraq or Afghanistan and will require $22 billion over the next five years to re-build 
                                                 
5 Lawrence J. Korb, “Caught Off Guard: The Link between our National Security and our National 
Guard,” Center for American Progress, May 2007. 
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itself.6  Therefore, formalizing volunteer efforts under one synchronized federal 
department is vital for an effective and comprehensive national emergency response. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 
9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can 
be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on 
the front lines. We must plan for that eventuality.  A rededication to 
preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we 
lost that day.7 
The 9/11 Commission emphasizes the importance of first responder training and 
prior joint planning.  The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also highlight the 
importance of coordination amongst the different responding agencies.  In fact, the slow 
Katrina response was attributed to “coordination difficulties” between the military, law 
enforcement, and civilian emergency management authorities.8  Perhaps part of the 
problem is that there are too many civilian emergency management authorities —
numerous local, state, and federal employees and volunteers — and, therefore, unification 
could lead to a solution. 
Another important reason for this research is to analyze the National Guard’s 
evolving role from a strategic reserve force to an operational active force.  As the 
National Guard increasingly assumes the role of the active Army’s operational reserve 
force, what consequences can be expected for domestic contingencies and homeland 
security?  Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting 
overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s National Guard responsibility 
                                                 
6 Fact Sheet, “The State of the U.S. Army,” found at 
http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/1464/CNASArmyReadiness_Factshee
tNov07.pdf, accessed on November 17, 2007, 1. 
7 The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 323. 
8 A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington D.C, U.S. House of Representatives, February 15 
2006), 3. 
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for homeland defense and civil support has remained constant.9  Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates has acknowledged that Army National Guard personnel and equipment 
levels are the lowest since 9/11 and, according to the chief of the National Guard 
Lieutenant General Steven Blum, “the Army National Guard only has 30% of its essential 
equipment here at home…it’s the first time such a shortfall has occurred in the past 35 
years.”10  The Arkansas National Guard is short 600 rifles and one-third of the Oklahoma 
National Guard is lacking M-4 rifles.11  In May 2007, Kansas Governor Kathleen 
Sebelius claimed that storm response efforts were greatly hindered since most of the 
National Guard’s recovery efforts are overseas supporting the war in Iraq12.  Essential 
emergency response equipment like high-water vehicles, refueling tankers, generators, 
tents, trucks, and semi-trailers are all overseas in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Prior to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Guard units of neighboring states could be called on to assist in 
emergencies; however, the same personnel and equipment shortages plague other states 
as well.  “The Iraq war has crippled Florida’s ability to respond to hurricanes,”13 and 
Major General Melvyn Mantano, the former head of the New Mexico National Guard, 
argues that the previous intra-state agreements are “practically nullified now because all 
states have people in Iraq,” and that there is no equipment to borrow since it’s all 
deployed.14  Clearly, it is not wise to rely solely on the National Guard to respond to 
large-scale emergencies.  Although the Iraq conflict may not last forever, the National 
Guard has many shortfalls that it must overcome in order to remain a reliable state 
response asset.   
                                                 
9 Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 4. 
10 Ibid., 4-5. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 KCBC News: Iraq War hampers Kansas cleanup, 
http://www.kcbs.com/pages/424076.php?contentType=4&contentId=472199 accessed on 
May 10, 2007. 
13 Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 9. 
14 Ibid., 6. 
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The latest U.S. Census reports that only 3%15 of the U.S. population serves on 
active military duty. This means that a great majority of U.S. citizens are available to 
serve the nation in other capacities.  Therefore, America does not lack the manpower to 
respond to future emergency disasters.  Currently, there are many civilian management 
authorities and emergency response entities.  The major agencies include the American 
Red Cross, the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Citizen Corps, the 
Disaster Assistance Employee program and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
to name just a few.  Although each agency is unique in its own way, all support disaster 
relief efforts and offer emergency response assets.  This multiplicity has led to confusion, 
competing agendas, and perhaps a duplication of efforts.  Therefore, a concerted and 
legitimate federal effort could circumvent these problematic possibilities and offer 
procedural solutions.  One agency could easily filter, sort, and analyze trained citizen 
volunteers across the nation and mobilize them according to the requirements of incident 
commanders and decision makers during national emergencies.16 
A well-structured and organized federal agency would need to be recognized by 
the federal government in order for it to be effective and for Americans to be responsive 
— especially since such an organization could mean the difference between life and 
death to citizens who require assistance when local and state resources are overwhelmed.  
Ironically, such legitimacy and directed power already exists with the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5).  This directive, implemented in February 2003, 
specifically outlines the management of domestic incidents17.   HSPD-5 specifically 
delegates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for 
domestic incident management; responsible for coordinating federal operations within the 
United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major 
                                                 
15 U.S. Census Bureau, Special Edition; US Armed Forces and Veterans 4/10/03, 
http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/001630.html accessed 
on May 5, 2007. 
16 Idea was taken from Research Focus Symposium: N/NC J6- Automated Data Filtering   
17 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Washington, DC, The White House, February 
2006) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html accessed April 27, 2007.   
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disasters, and other emergencies18.  It states, “the objective of the United States 
Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the nation have the 
capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to 
domestic incident management.”19  HSPD-5 clearly indicates that all responsible 
agencies at the federal, state, and local level need to understand how to integrate response 
capabilities prior to the next major disaster.  Therefore, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security has the authority to establish a DHS-Reserves program to facilitate the intent of 
HSPD-5 and effectively respond to future national emergencies.  Doing so significantly 
increases the chances for a more efficient and effective emergency response, thus greatly 
reducing the loss of lives and property often attributed to a slow and poorly planned 
response.  Establishing a DHS-Reserve, therefore, should be viewed as an incremental 
change in line with Presidential Directive-5. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Upon a thorough literature review of emergency volunteer response programs, 
domestic emergency responses, and the diminution of readiness of the National Guard, 
several recurring themes surfaced.  Despite the fact that the National Guard has been 
enveloped by our nation’s current overseas conflicts, there is a plethora of volunteer 
emergency response assets at all levels of emergency preparedness.  There seems to be a 
gap, however, in coordinating the numerous efforts.  Furthermore, the need for trained 
first responders and citizen involvement is highlighted in the after action reviews of 
recent major catastrophes.  Lastly, several experts in the Homeland Security arena have 
speculated or hinted that perhaps a citizen reserve corps or homeland security auxiliary 
should be formed to augment the National Guard in light of increased terrorist threats.  
For these reasons, I am pursuing the concept of creating a Department of Homeland 
Security-Reserves. 
Several federal, state, and local organizations currently provide support in the 
event of a local or national emergency.  Although the various emergency response 
                                                 
18 The White House, Presidential Directive/HSPD-5. 
19 Ibid. 
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organizations are not standardized, some of these organizations require formal training, 
provide equitable reimbursement, and have very formal and effective recall procedures.  
These same organizations participate in scenario-based exercises in preparation for both 
man-made and natural disasters.  Therefore, it seems that these organizations have the 
characteristics to provide an effective and coordinated response to an emergency disaster; 
however, the response to Hurricane Katrina has been highly criticized as being a poorly 
coordinated emergency response.  The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed serious 
shortcomings in emergency response.  Another case in point occurred less than a year 
before Hurricane Katrina in 2004 when Citizen Corps was activated in Florida — for one 
of the first times since its inception — in response to four hurricanes that occurred within 
a 44-day span.20  According to one emergency preparedness expert, the large numbers of 
untrained volunteers, without formal credentials, training or leadership skills, added to 
the Florida disaster chaos.21  This is evidence that an uncoordinated volunteer force can 
be a hindrance, rather than a solution, during a large-scale emergency response if not 
well-established and implemented correctly. 
My preliminary research suggests that there may be too many emergency 
response entities and that those currently in place may be outdated or no longer reliable.  
For instance, the Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), established in 
1996, is a congressionally ratified program that provides each state a structure for 
interstate mutual relief.22  Although EMAC is federally administered by the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), it is strictly an individual, state-driven mutual 
aid program that is voluntary for each state and governor.  The partnership offers inter-
state support in the event of natural or man-made disasters.  This program is a voluntary 
agreement upon each state and is not highly publicized as a national effort.  Although 
EMAC and military assistance were highly critical in restoring law and order during 
Hurricane Katrina, a bipartisan report prepared for the House of Representatives 
                                                 
20 Tampa Bay Online, “44 Days of Dread,” http://tbo.com/hurricane2004/tribuneedition.html 
accessed on May 12, 2007. 
21 Personal Interview with Ellis Stanley, General Manager- Emergency Preparedness Department, City 
of Los Angeles, on May 11, 2007. 
22 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, www.emacweb.org/ accessed on May 7, 2007. 
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concluded that “the current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not 
fast or suited to a large-scale emergency.”23  Furthermore, it forces states to rely on 
existing or in some cases, stale compacts with neighboring states to respond to natural 
disasters, terror attacks, or civil disturbances, despite desperate shortages of Guardsmen, 
equipment, and other response assets. 
Another important aspect of this research will focus on incentivizing such a 
federal volunteer program.   A federal-led volunteer program could have lasting impacts 
for civilian volunteers.  In addition to becoming a form of national service, it could 
produce a well-qualified, dependable, and standardized civilian volunteer response force 
available to incident commanders at all levels of government.  Several legislations are 
now being introduced in Washington, DC, to enlist citizen involvement.24  Congressman 
Charles Rangel (D-NY) has introduced a national service proposal in which all citizens 
between the ages of 18-42 are obliged to serve a period of military or civilian (homeland) 
service for the common defense of the nation.25  The implementation of this legislation 
could personalize the toll of American lives lost overseas and at home, thus creating a 
sense of nationalism.  The incentives for such a system could be modeled after the Armed 
Forces-Reserves and other volunteer organizations.  Such incentives, coupled with 
citizen’s inherent desire to serve, could provide a huge pool of willing, able, and specialty 
skilled volunteers.  The incentives could be packaged individually for each set of 
specialized skills, i.e., MDs, disaster analysts, therapy counselors, police, fire, college 
students, military retiree’s, etc.  This thesis will conceptualize some incentives for 
“activated” volunteers, which include pay, medical benefits, employment protection, 
special training, insurance, selective service credit and other types of compensation 
depending on their specialty and length of service.  Some incentives for “stand by” 
volunteers include college tuition assistance, loan repayment, tax focused benefits, 
education privileges, monetary bonuses for “low-density” skills, and perhaps discounts at 
certain locations.  A federal level volunteer organization could also encourage employers 
                                                 
23 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 227. 
24 Interview, Congressmen Sam Farr, March 2007. 
25 Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 6. 
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to look favorable at those serving and offer added incentives which could also lead to 
increased emergency preparedness in the private sector.   
Another resource that is currently not being used to its potential is to specifically 
recruit military personnel that are transitioning out or retiring for specific homeland 
security purposes.  Many of these men and women already posses useful qualities, 
professional skills, loyal sense of duty, and in some cases, security clearances that can 
directly benefit DHS, and an emergency disaster response.  Active duty personnel should 
have the opportunity to transition to the Department of Homeland Security or continue to 
serve in a DHS-Reserves capacity.  This is particularly important right now since military 
active duty personnel and National Guardsmen are choosing the private sector over re-
enlistment at an alarming rate.  Not surprisingly the Army National Guard fell short of its 
recruiting goals in 2005 and 2006.26  Creating the opportunity for military members to 
serve out their federal term as a DHS-reservist, as opposed to a military-reservist can lead 
to a highly skilled citizen reserve corps ready to respond to domestic emergencies. 
Another potential benefit of such a high profile federal program is that colleges 
and privatized businesses would become introduced to homeland security.  It is 
conceivable that colleges could require a minimum amount of homeland security course 
credit to graduate or offer homeland security courses as optional electives, thus 
eventually creating concentrated curriculums that could encourage students to declare a 
homeland security related major.  Private businesses could give preferential credit to 
DHS-reservists in an attempt to improve infrastructure preparedness.   The potential 
positives from such a program are endless, and all would include citizen preparedness, 
disaster alertness, and perhaps a more educated public. 
Lastly, this thesis will briefly cover the challenges of implementing such a large 
scale volunteer response program.   
                                                 
26 Korb, “Caught Off Guard” 3. 
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1. Methodology 
To fully conceptualize a “Department of Homeland Security-Reserves” (DHS-R), 
this thesis investigates gaps in volunteer emergency response efforts to large-scale 
disasters.  I also conducted several interviews with emergency preparedness officials and 
attended a Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense exercise in which several organizations 
converge to a large-scale disaster.   This thesis focuses on volunteer responses of natural 
and man-made disasters in order to identify sustainable actions and flaws.  Furthermore, 
this thesis analyzes the various capacities that could contribute to a successful volunteer 
emergency response and how the applicability of a mobilized DHS-Reserve force could 
best be used.  I reviewed several after action reports and analyze the details of the 
volunteer responses to fully explore the concept of a Department of Homeland Security-
Reserves. 
Over the course of this research, I contacted various federal, state, and local 
emergency response organizations such as the California Office of Homeland Security, 
the Los Angeles City and County office of Emergency Preparedness, the 
FEMA/USNORTHCOM liaison, Citizen Corps, FEMA’s Disaster Assistance Employee 
(DAE) program manager, the DoD Homeland Defense Policy Office, and the founders of 
the Community Emergency Response Teams.  I also interviewed Mr. Frank Borden and 
Mr. Bob Lee, founders of the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT).  They 
provided me with valuable information as to how they implemented a successful 
volunteer program.  I also met with the Mr. Ellis Stanley, General Manager of 
Emergency Preparedness for LA City, who guided my research.  I also met with Mr. Bill 
Carwile of FEMA and Mr. Charles Adams of DHS, whose homeland security expertise 
and experience played a key role in my final analysis.   
Finally, there is no doubt that Department of Defense resources improve and 
supplement national response capabilities.  Currently, DoD is the only federal department 
with supporting responsibilities in each of the fifteen Emergency Support Functions 
(ESFs) of the National Response Plan.27  However, it is not wise to rely so heavily on 
                                                 
27 House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 202. 
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DoD efforts alone, especially as the war on terror continue to exhaust federal and state 
personnel and resources.    Therefore, creating or unifying emergency response assets 
could effectively fill potential gaps, greatly increasing national response capabilities. 
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II.  EXISTING VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS AND GAPS IN 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
The United States has a rich history of volunteers answering the call of civil-
service duty.  “Minute Men,” “Citizen Soldiers,” “Deputized Citizens,” “Volunteer Fire 
and Policemen,” “Auxiliaries,” “Cadets” and “Reservists” are all community volunteers 
of emergency and first responder organizations.  While “Good Samaritans” often help out 
in spontaneous situations, the deliberate preparation and planning to have a group of 
trained ready and capable volunteers in reserve is not as defined, except maybe for 
military, police, and fire forces.  Additionally, the degree of training required is distinctly 
different for “first responders” who arrive at an incident in the first 24-48 hours, as 
opposed to “recovery responders,” who arrive after the first 48 hours of an incident.  This 
leads to the notion that a formalized volunteer response organization with multiple levels 
of training and capabilities is beneficial to mitigate future man-made and natural 
disasters. 
The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted 
volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen 
Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-R.  
Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at every level 
of the government.  This chapter will focus on existing volunteer emergency response 
organizations and identify gaps by analyzing several after action reports and investigating 
emergency response operations.  Although there are many public and private 
organizations dedicated to emergency response, this chapter will highlight the most 
widely known and used organizations: the U.S. National Guard (USNG), the newly 
developed Citizen Corps, the Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE), the American Red 
Cross, and the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT).  The organizational 
































Table 1.   Major volunteer organizations and parent units. 
A. THE U.S. NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMED FORCES-RESERVES 
Pulling residents from rooftops, out of attics, and directly from the water, 
the men and women of the Louisiana National Guard were there, saving 
thousands of lives. 
— Major General Bennett C. Landreneau 
Select Committee hearing on Hurricane Katrina 
 
The Armed Forces and specifically the National Guard, undoubtedly has one of 
the most comprehensive reserve programs established.  Although the U.S. National 
Emergency Response Assets 
 
Service/Agency  Reserve (Volunteers)      Auxiliary       Youth Programs 
 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
 
 
  Army    U.S. Army Reserve &            Scout Programs 
   State National Guards  
 
  Navy   Navy Reserve        Power Squadron           Sea-Scouts    
  Marine Corps  Marine Reserve             Devil Pups 
 
  Air Force   USAF Reserve &       Civil Air Patrol (CAP)    CAP Cadets  
State Air Guards  
 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 
  Coast Guard (CG)  CG Reserve          CG Auxiliary                  Sea Scouts 
  
  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  
   Citizen Corps 
Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE)   
    
Volunteers: Federal, State and Local 
 
American Red Cross 
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) 
Police and Fire volunteers 
Search and Rescue Teams 
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Guard and Armed Forces Reserves are a military organization, its members must still 
volunteer and take an oath to serve when needed.  Since its inception in 1636 as “citizen 
soldiers,” the National Guard has responded to natural and man made disasters, however 
never has there been a time in history when their motto, “Always ready, always there,” 
has been more challenged than by today’s impeding war requirements.   
The National Guard’s role has drastically evolved from aiding the victory in the 
Revolutionary war to providing imminent service in response to 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina.  What began as a precautionary force against standing armies that permeated the 
colonies has expanded to a versatile military force that is now called up by state 
governors’ several hundred times each year.  The National Guard is unique because of its 
dual-mission acting as a wartime-ready force and as a first military responder in times of 
domestic crisis.  Its federal mission is to maintain properly trained and equipped units 
available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergencies, or as otherwise needed.  
Its state mission is to provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or 
as otherwise required by state law.  Its responsibilities include preparing for and 
responding to whatever nature presents including; floods, fires, hurricanes, earthquakes 
as well as miscellaneous events such as epidemics and domestic acts of destruction.   
In order to be capable to respond to such occurrences, Guardsmen complete a 
standardized curriculum of training and attend sustainment training sessions once a 
month and two weeks each year.  Coined as “weekend warriors,” these men and women 
maintain professional civilian careers during the week, virtually wearing a suit and tie 
Monday through Friday, and camouflage fatigues on the weekend.  Their monthly and 
annual trainings usually consist of basic soldier skills and individual job proficiency.  
Each Guardsman has a specific occupational specialty and is trained accordingly to the 
level of their rank.  Additionally, each person is issued a standard identification, uniform, 
and job skill.  Most National Guard units are categorized by duty description and 
capability.  For instance, a California civil engineer unit is specially trained and equipped 
to work on civil engineer projects throughout the state of California.  Consequently, this 
type of unit is more likely to be activated to respond to certain natural disasters, such as 
the New Orleans response and recovery efforts during Hurricane Katrina.  
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The National Guard’s recruitment is also unique since it recruits, trains, and 
maintains its forces in the same community.  Since the National Guard is mainly 
responsible for protecting state lines, the soldiers that volunteer to serve are usually 
derived from their respective state and local communities.  Although both the active 
reserve components of the Army are struggling to meet recruitment goals, the Guard has 
created a new incentive program that offers guard members up to $2,000 for bringing 
new recruits into the organization.  Soldier who participate in this program typically 
recruit their family, friends and neighbors for their same hometown unit28.  They are 
residents who want to serve their country and state while still living a “normal” life.  The 
fact that the Guard recruits their members from their respective communities has a direct 
impact on the institution itself and the community where they are from, which indirectly 
fosters public opinion; essentially bringing the war on terror to the homes and 
communities of the guardsmen activated.  This effect creates a sense of ‘nationalism’ 
since the people responding to incidents or going off to war are fathers, daughters, 
teachers, and other community members that often leave obvious voids in the 
community.  It is now common for family members to serve in the same theater since 
many members are from the same hometown unit.  This phenomenon also helps the 
National Guard maintain a positive image amongst the population. 
Historically, participation in the National Guard or Reserve forces required little 
to no time away from home and the original workplace.  This notion began to fade in 
1991 when more than 250,000 guard and reservists were activated for the Persian Gulf.29  
Today, more than a quarter of a million members of the U.S. National Guard have served 
in Afghanistan and/or Iraq.30  Some members have served multiple tours turning their 
nine-to-five office job and one weekend a month into a twenty-four hour, twelve month 
overseas deployment.  Although this type of prolonged commitment would otherwise 
                                                 
28 Michelle Tan, “Little time, big demand; Reserve chief looks to optimize deployment training,” 
Army Times, June 4, 2007, 26. 
29 Eric Yoder, “National Guard and Army Reserve Incentives; Guard, Reserve Employment Rights,” 
Washington Post, June 25, 2004, 1. 
30 Larry Minear, “The U.S. Citizen-Solider and the Global War on Terror: The National Guard 
experience,” Feinstein International Center, September 2007, 3. 
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jeopardize their civilian jobs, each member of the National Guard is protected under the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act31 of 1940.  This Act 
protects part-time service members’ rights and their employee privileges against adverse 
employment actions associated with an employee’s extended active duty deployment.  
Other benefits that activated reservists receive include medical, dental, and full-time 
monetary compensation.  Some are even awarded special bonuses and reimbursements 
for travel.  Those on stand by, receive educational tuition assistance, certain discounts, 
and part-time pay, which equates to their regular pay pro-rated for the amount of time 
they work.  Those with 20 years of service are eligible for military retirement and 
veterans’ disability compensation.  The monetary costs of maintaining a ready-reserve 
force is unlimited considering the inherent mission of the Department of Defense.  The 
National Guard and Reserves manages to maintain ready, trained, equipped and capable 
forces at a significantly reduced cost than their active duty counterparts.  Typically, one 
Reserve/Guard person costs 20% to 25% of what it costs to employ an active duty 
military person.  Theoretically, the nation can employ four or five reservists for the salary 
of one active duty person.  The Military Reserves are a unique component of the 
Department of Defense that allow it to maintain a substantial ready-reserve force for both 
domestic and overseas missions — all while staying with DoD fiscal constraints.  
Clearly, this capability is currently exercised as National Guardsmen and Reservists 
continue to be activated in support of the global war on terror.   
The National Guard and Reserve forces are going through a transformation 
process, which has exposed some problematic circumstances.  Most Army Guard units 
are not combat-ready in terms of personnel and equipment.32  According to Army 
Reserve Chief, Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, “we’re getting units ready just in time to 
go.”  Perhaps one of the biggest problems stems from “cross-leveling,” which is a policy 
that fills unit personnel and equipment shortages from other not-currently deployed units.  
An example of this is a California National Guard transportation unit that had only seven 
                                                 
31 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 
http://www.osc.gov/userra.htm accessed on October 29, 2007, 38 U.S.C. § 4301. 
32 William H. McMichael, “The fight to fix the Guard and Reserves; commission, lawmakers at odd 
over solutions to myriad problems,” Army Times, March 19, 2007, 34. 
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of the soldiers required for mobilization and had to draw 163 Reservists from a total of 65 
units from 49 locations.33  Since Guard and Reserve units are tight-knit and usually from 
the same community, cross-leveling greatly degrades the unit cohesion and effectiveness.  
National Guard leaders, including Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, director of the 
Army National Guard, confirm “that breaking up units and cross-leveling soldiers eats 
away at unit cohesion and damages unit readiness.”34  Despite these problems, a recent 
panel discussion led by General Charles Campbell, the commander of the Forces 
Command, outlined the need for the Guard and Reserve to become operational forces, a 
huge generational shift from their traditional role as a strategic ready-reserve force.35  
Campbell argued that the demand for troops in the “generational conflict,” of Iraq and 
Afghanistan exceeds the supply, making it critical to use the Guard and Reserve forces to 
meet the needs of commanders in theater. 
Today, National Guard and Reserve units continue to fill active duty voids.  Most 
recently, the Department of Defense announced that eight Army National Guard brigades 
have been alerted for deployment — seven bound for Iraq and one bound for 
Afghanistan, equaling more than 21,000 troops.36  As of May 2007, the 144,202 U.S. 
force members in Iraq included 23,534 members of the National Guard or Reserves.37  In 
addition to supporting the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, these forces must remain 
available and ready on the home front as first responders to domestic natural or man-
made disasters as part of their homeland defense mission to support federal, state, and 
local authorities.   
 
                                                 
33 McMichael, “The fight to fix the Guard and Reserves,” 34. 
34 Michelle Tan, “Tapping the Guard; call-up sends 21,000 soldiers to fill active duty void,” Army 
Times, October 29, 2007, 8. 
35 Tan, “Guard, Reserve set to take on a large new role,” Army Times, October 22, 2007, 22. 
36 Tan, “Tapping the Guard,” 8. 
37 Minear, “The U.S. Citizen-Solider and the Global War on Terror,” 17. 
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Table 2.   National Guard Deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq, September 2001-June 
200738 
B.  CITIZEN CORPS 
Citizen Corps is a federal volunteer organization that brings community and 
government leaders together to involve community members in all-hazards community 
preparedness, planning, mitigation, response and recovery. The mission of Citizen Corps 
is to harness the power of every individual through education, training, and volunteer 
service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats 
of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds.  Originally created 
under the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Grants and Training, it has 
recently moved to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.   
Citizen Corps has many of the same qualities that a DHS-Reserve program could 
integrate.  Citizen Corps is already a derivative of the Department of Homeland Security 
and one of the only comprehensive efforts to link federal, state, and local governments 
with non-government organizations to achieve emergency preparedness.  The program 
acknowledges that citizens must take an active responsibility in their communities and 
                                                 
38 Minear, “The U.S. Citizen-Solider and the Global War on Terror,” 17. 
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may have to respond to local emergencies.  Therefore, Citizen Corps takes an active role 
in planning, educating, and training citizens across the United States, at over 2,100 
citizen corps councils, and establishing several private and volunteer partnerships and 
affiliates at all levels of government.  Some of the prominent partners include the Medial 
Reserve Corps, the Fire Corps, the Volunteers in Police Service, and the American Red 
Cross.  Post-Hurricane Katrina, many Citizen Corps volunteers worked side-by-side with 
Red Cross to give aid to those families in need.39  The following table illustrates the 
major partnerships and affiliates associated with Citizen Corps. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Major Partnerships and Affiliates of Citizen Corps (From 40). 
Citizen Corps currently has 2,281 councils in every state across the U.S. and 
annexed territories.  Figure 2 depicts the vast spread of Citizen Corps councils at the local 
and state level.  Each council has responsibilities which include coordination between 
                                                 
39 “Citizen Corps Newsletter; March 2007,” http://www.citizencorps.gov/pdf/newsletter/cc-newsletter-
march2007.pdf, accessed on September 17, 2007, 4. 
40 Citizen Corps Programs & Partners, “Citizen Corps Overview,” 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/doc/2007_nccp/CitizenCorpsOverview.pdf, accessed November 1, 2007, 20. 
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agencies, identifying priorities that involve the entire community and integrating 
resources for community preparedness.  To accomplish this, Citizen Corps’ receives 
several grants and political appropriations.  Its fiscal budget has fluctuated since its 
inception, ranging from $6 million in 2002 rising to $40 million in 2004, down to $15 
million for the past two years.  Although this program has federal grants and funding, 




Figure 2.   Map of U.S. Citizen Corps Councils (From: 41). 
 
Although Citizen Corps’ resembles many of the characteristics and coordinating 
features of a possible DHS-R program, the distinct differences will be discussed in the 
following chapter of this thesis.  It is quite possible that a DHS-R program could build on 
the existing Citizen Corps unity of effort. 
                                                 
41 Citizen Corps Programs & Partners, “Citizen Corps Overview,”16. 
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C.  DISASTER ASSISTANCE EMPLOYEES 
The Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) program is another program managed 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  These employees are temporarily hired 
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, 
which is designed to bring orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster 
assistance for state and local governments.  This Act allows FEMA the ability to 
federally fund and coordinate government wide relief efforts to domestic emergencies.  
Therefore, FEMA has the ability to hire DAEs for various purposes at specific locations 
to mitigate emergencies both as they happen and in recovery efforts. 
Disaster Assistance Employees, sometimes called FEMA’s “reservists,” perform 
response and recovery activities, usually at sites in disaster damaged areas.  Although 
there are several categories of DAE employment ranging from permanent-temporary (40-
hrs/week) to intermittent-temporary (on-call) and part-time temporary, each vary in skill 
level and work required.  Some jobs are event specific and require short lengths of 
employment while others require an initial appointment of up to one-year and may be 
renewed incrementally each year.  DAEs are paid an equitable salary based on the type of 
work they perform.   
FEMA relies on DAEs to provide critical functions during national emergencies.  
During hurricane Katrina, DAEs were integral in performing various technical and 
administrative keys functions.42  DAEs greatly contribute to FEMA’s ability to assist 
state and local governments in emergency disasters.  DAEs are selected based on their 
ability to produce high quality work under minimal supervision, often times under 
pressure in a dynamic work environment.  The average DAE already works in an 
emergency preparedness field or at least has the capability to work in this type of 
environment.   
Although this program deals with emergency response and recovery efforts, it is 
distinctly different from a DHS-R program since its employees are not voluntary and all 
                                                 
42 Frank Elopes, Disaster Assistance employee during Hurricane Katrina, personal interview on July 
11, 2007. 
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DAEs must be U.S. citizens.  DAEs are often summonsed on short notice and must be 
prepared to relocate to emergency sites for long periods.  Most Disaster Assistance 
Employees are on a 24-hr recall time which makes it hard for them to maintain regular 
working hours, thus making the DAE program available to a specific population pool. 
D.  THE AMERICAN RED CROSS 
The American Red Cross is perhaps the most famous volunteer organization in 
world and in the United States.  Its Congressional Charter and fundamental structure 
under the International Red Cross organization, enables it to provide relief and comfort to 
victims of natural or man-made disasters.  It is strictly a non-governmental voluntary 
organization with international and national support.   
Red Cross response teams are among the first to arrive at a disaster, often provide 
emergency assistance to victims and support other first-responders.  At the Pentagon 
attacks of 9/11, after the terrorist attack victims were evacuated, they transitioned to 
providing medical care and assistance for on-scene first responders.  The organization’s 
unique structure and blood services enables it to reach multiple and distant communities.  
Its rich history and experience in disaster preparedness and response is an asset to all 
levels of government.43 
The Red Cross provides aid to victims and their families during and after 
disasters.  The core mission is to assist victims by enabling them to resume their normal 
daily activities as soon as possible.  The disaster relief services focuses on meeting 
people’s immediate disaster-related needs.  Each year, the American Red Cross responds 
to more than 70,000 disasters and accidents including home fires, hurricanes, floods, 
earthquakes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, transportation accidents, explosions, 
and other domestic natural and man-made disasters44.  The Red Cross provides shelters, 
food, health, and mental services to victims in need.  Additionally, the Red Cross also 
                                                 
43 “America’s Disasters 2004; meeting the challenge,” available at    
http://www.redcross.org/pubs/dspubs/amdisasters2004.pdf, accessed on October 27, 2007, 4. 
44 American Red Cross Disaster Services, http://redcross.org/services/disaster/0,1082,0_319_,00.html, 
accessed on October 27, 2007, 1 
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provides food and shelters for emergency workers, blood services and supplies to disaster 
victims, and valuable resource-information to victims that need additional services 
beyond the disaster.  The Red Cross also handles inquiries from family members outside 
the disaster area.   
In response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the Red Cross mobilized 
more than 233,000 workers, mostly volunteers, to the Gulf Coast region for the largest 
humanitarian response to a domestic natural disaster in American Red Cross history.45  
Then in the 2007 California Fires, the Red Cross mobilized close to 7,000 workers and 
volunteers to the help in the largest evacuation of California history.  The Red Cross 
provided imminent services to victims that were evacuated and to those that lost their 
belongings.  The Red Cross served meals and snacks, as well as set up shelters for many 
of the displaced victims.  In the aftermath of the fires, the Red Cross continues to offer 
other types of support to the victims and their families.  
Often times a disaster’s impact is felt long after the initial event.  For this, the Red 
Cross has emotional and psychological services available to disaster recovery victims.  
This is a very important piece of disaster recovery that is often overlooked.  For many 
victims, the post stress trauma is just as intense as the physical damage.  After Hurricane 
Katrina, the Red Cross deployed nearly 4,600 licensed health and mental professionals to 
the scene to help victims cope with their losses.46  Assisting these victims mentally is 
equally as vital as the monetary or physical support they receive.  Clearly the American 
Red Cross makes significant strides to help Americans in need. 
E.  COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS (CERTS) 
Community Emergency Response Teams were founded by Chief Frank Borden of 
the Los Angeles Fire Department.  Chief Borden responded to Mexico City’s 1985 
earthquake as part of a U.S. assessment team.  Chief Borden and other member of the 
                                                 
45 Citizen Corps Newsletter; March 2007, 4. 
46 “The Face of Recovery; The American Red Cross Response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma- 
Two Year Report,” http://www.redcross.org/static/file_cont6989_lang0_2850.pdf, accessed on October 29, 
2007, 6. 
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team were amazed at the community response efforts in which spontaneous volunteers 
saved over 800 lives.  As part of the disaster response, 100 untrained-volunteers also lost 
their lives while attempting to save others.  The lessons learned from the Mexico City 
disaster and the surprising volunteer efforts convinced Chief Borden that Los Angeles 
should develop a plan to help themselves.  Los Angeles developed a pilot program in 
1986 to train volunteers in emergency response functions so that volunteers could 
effectively help in disaster scenarios47.   
Today, the CERT program serves state and local communities across America.  
The program has evolved drastically since 1986- first in 1993, when FEMA chose to 
adopt the CERT program and curriculum in order to make it available to communities 
nationwide, and then in 2002 when CERT became an affiliate of Citizen Corps.  As of 
2004, each state had Community Emergency Response Teams, as well as three U.S. 
territories, and even six foreign countries.48 
The CERT program educates people about disaster preparedness and encourages 
them to take a more active role in emergency preparedness.  This program is one of the 
first grass-root organizations to enlist community members in their own preparedness, 
response and recovery efforts.  Although Los Angeles was already a strong 
“neighborhood watch” community, this program brought people “out of their homes” to 
help each other out.  As a result, Los Angeles runs one of the most comprehensive CERT 
programs in America through its fire department.  Although each CERT varies by 
location, level of training and number of teams, all CERT graduates complete the same 
basic curriculum. 
The CERT curriculum and training is open to anyone over the age of 18 and is 
free of charge.  The curriculum consists of various levels of emergency response and first 
aid courses.  The basic national CERT curriculum includes disaster preparedness, fire 
suppression (most used), disaster medical operations, multi-casualty triage and treatment, 
                                                 
47 Frank Borden (Chief-Ret.), Los Angeles Fire Department and founder of the Community 
Emergency Response Teams, personal interview on August 17, 2007. 
48 “Community Emergency Response Teams; What is CERT,” http://www.cert-
la.com/WhatIsCert.htm, accessed on October 31, 2007. 
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search and rescue, disaster psychology, disaster simulation and an overview of terrorism.  
Some regions add location-specific training tailored to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, 
and terrorism.  Los Angeles-based CERTs incorporate the American Red Cross’s 50-hour 
“Emergency Response Advanced First Aid” certification as part of their advanced CERT 
curriculum.  Regardless of location, the mere fact that citizens are coming together on 
their own to increase their disaster preparedness illustrates that people are willing to 
volunteer even if it means being put in harm’s way.  Perhaps an established CERT 
program during the Mexico City earthquake could have circumvented the loss of the 100 
brave volunteers. 
F. GAPS IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
This portion of this thesis will analyze various after action reports and studies 
dealing with emergency response operations to Hurricane Katrina and the Pentagon 
attacks of 9/11.  It is not meant to criticize any particular organization or belittle their 
purpose or diminish the heroic acts of the many volunteers who often risk their lives to 
save others. 
1. Hurricane Katrina 
The 2005 Hurricane season caused so much damage, human suffering, and 
devastation that the name Katrina, Rita, and Wilma will never again be used for any 
future tropical storm.49  These hurricanes also exposed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in 
the emergency response system and volunteer organizations.   
a. National Guard 
The National Guard is unique in its versatility to fight our nation’s wars 
while, at the same time, respond to domestic emergencies when they are called.  This 
characteristic has become a point of contention across the U.S. as to when to use this 
part-time military force, especially after 9/11 since the Guard is caught in the middle of  
 
                                                 
49 “From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross Actions to Improve and Enhance its Disaster 
Response and Related Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond,” 
http://www.redcross.org/static/file_cont5448_lang0_2006.pdf, accessed October 29, 2007, 3. 
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committing members and equipment to the war on terror and, at the same time, maintain 
a ready-reserve force prepared to respond to national disasters as outlined in the National 
Response Plan. 
In an effort to learn from the past, the U.S. House of Representatives 
commissioned a Select Bipartisan Committee to investigate the preparation and response 
to Hurricane Katrina.  Although the Committee identified failures at all levels of 
government, this portion of this thesis will only highlight the National Guard’s role. 
The National Guard contributed heavily to Katrina response efforts 
including search and rescue operations, commodity distribution, air and ground 
transportation, and rendering much needed assistance to civilian law enforcement.  Prior 
to Hurricane Katrina, the largest National Guard response to a hurricane had been in 1992 
during Hurricane Andrew.  By contrast, the National Guard constituted 24% of the 
military response to Hurricane Andrew as opposed to more than 70% during Hurricane 
Katrina.  The military response to Katrina was so massive, that according to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, “the DoD’s response to the 
catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the 
United States since the Civil War.”50  Table 3 shows the exact numbers of military 
responders to Hurricane Katrina. 
 
 
                                                 
50 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 201. 
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Table 3.   National Guard and Active Duty members deployed in support of Hurricane 
Katrina (From51). 
 
Many of the problems identified with Katrina are categorized by the report 
as “information gaps,” which are related to communication implications or a lack of 
information flow, leading to miscommunications and a dire lack of coordination.  The 
report stresses that DoD, DHS, FEMA and the state of Louisiana had trouble 
coordinating response efforts which slowed the response.  In fact, DoD had not yet 
implemented the lessons learned from prior joint exercises involving military assistance 
to civil authorities.  Many of those lessons learned would have enhanced a federally 
coordinated Katrina response.  DHS also lacked written instruction to help DoD 
                                                 
51 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 202. 
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determine their role and responsibilities during military assistance to civil authority 
operations.  In fact, according to the Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense, Pete F. Verga, “to my knowledge, no such document 
exists.”52 
Furthermore, DoD lacked an information sharing protocol which would 
have facilitated joint situational awareness and communications between all military 
components.  The ‘Joint’ Task Force Katrina command and staff also lacked joint 
training and knowledge of the National Incident Management System, which contributed 
to the lack of coordination amongst federal components.  Lastly, the National Guard and 
active duty units reported that they had never formally coordinated with Northern 
Command, who presumably was the lead DoD liaison and bridge between DoD and the 
civilian counterparts.53  Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of Northern 
Command, stated that, “during the first four days, no single organization or agency was 
in charge providing a coordinated effort for rescue operations.”54  This undoubtedly led 
to confusion and perhaps frustrations which led to duplication of efforts between active 
duty and National Guard units.  For example, the 82nd Airborne Division (active duty) 
moved into a sector that was already occupied and patrolled by the National Guard.55  
The bipartisan report concluded that Northern Command does not have adequate insight 
into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to 
a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response.   
b. FEMA 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency also conducted a review 
regarding its mission assignments to federal agencies to provide volunteers in response to 
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.  Although the volunteers cited their experience as 
overwhelmingly rewarding, they also identified several shortcomings and lessons 
learned.  The report itself identified a total of 1,038 volunteers deployed, including 321 
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53 Ibid., 219. 
54 Ibid.,  230. 
55 Ibid.,  219. 
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from fourteen agencies external to DHS.  Both FEMA and DHS officials, however, 
believe that many more volunteers were present than accounted for in FEMA records.56  
These misgivings could have been prevented if FEMA would have used the proper 
notification chain, instead of contacting the volunteers directly.  Bypassing the parent 
organization that was originally designated to coordinate response efforts, limited the 
agency’s knowledge and whereabouts of their volunteers, thus hindering the record-
keeping process.  In some cases, agencies and supervisors were not even aware of their 
volunteer’s deployment. 
Volunteers also mentioned that loose coordination led to 
misunderstandings and confusion about which expenses were reimbursable, the type of 
work or skills needed, and other administrative and logistical type concerns.  As large 
numbers of volunteers began to show up to the vicinity of the disaster, lodging and food 
establishments became scarce because of the displaced victims and lack of prior 
coordination.  One frustrated volunteer said “there is nothing worse than having hundreds 
of volunteers standing around without anything to do or a place to stay.”  Volunteers also 
mentioned that there was no prior-screening to match skill sets with assignments, which 
wasted valuable talent and productivity.  The examples cited by the report were people 
with computer skills doing manual labor and those with carpentry skills working in 
offices.  There was no attempt to seek out those with bilingual language skills, 
psychological counseling qualifications, or other critical talents.  Pre-identifying 
volunteers and matching them to potential assignments could benefit an emergency 
response when time is critical.  FEMA’s report concluded that it should follow proper 
protocol when requesting volunteers and that it should compile a database of volunteers 
with critical skills, knowledge, abilities, and relevant training.   
c. Citizen Corps 
Citizen Corps conducted five national surveys after Hurricane Katrina.  
The results highlighted many key elements that must be addressed prior to another mass-
casualty incident such as Hurricane Katrina.  The following lessons learned are a 
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summary from the final review.57  Four out of the five surveys confirm that the events of 
Hurricane Katrina have not increased the level of citizen preparedness, while the fifth 
survey claims that the level of preparedness has actually decreased.  The review also 
concluded that people with disabilities or those caring for people with disabilities are a 
great disadvantage during a disaster.  The surveys also confirmed the existence of an 
income gap in the level of preparedness and that race only plays a minor role in 
preparedness.  Finally and perhaps the lesson with the largest implications is the fact that 
the events of Hurricane Katrina have tarnished the image and trust that Americans have 
in the government’s ability to respond effectively to a disaster.  These lessons learned 
from these surveys verify the need for a federally coordinated emergency response 
capability.    
d. Red Cross 
At the completion of the 2005 hurricane season, the Red Cross conducted 
an internal investigation and analysis in an effort to improve their disaster response and 
capabilities.  The following highlights are taken from the results of their analysis titled, 
“From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross actions to improve and enhance its 
disaster response and related capabilities for the 2006 hurricane season and beyond.” 
Hurricane Katrina was the first disaster in Red Cross history in which they 
served one million meals in a single day and provided financial assistance to more than a 
million American families after a single disaster.  Their efforts undoubtedly brought 
peace of mind to many residents; however “it is equally true that some issues that came to 
light were the result of poor coordination by the Red Cross with its partners or because of 
weakened systems that had not been sufficiently modernized to accommodate the 
catastrophic proportion of the 2005 hurricane relief effort.”58 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross realizes that it does a 
good job at “Red Cross-centric” responses; however it must make institutional changes in 
order to meet future challenges.  Some of the other major lessons learned entail 
                                                 
57 Citizen Preparedness Review, “A Post-Katrina Assessment,” Issue 2, Spring 2006, 1. 
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accountability and the strengthening of community partnerships.  The Red Cross realized 
that it must do a better job to protect itself against fraud, waste and abuse.  Red Cross 
leadership is concerned that the capability to respond to disasters cannot come at the 
expense of accountability.  Therefore, the Red Cross is implanting “vigorous control 
measures” to protect itself against vulnerabilities related to waste, fraud, and criminal 
wrong-doing.  Furthermore, it recognizes the need that each disaster is unique in terms of 
demographics, languages spoken, cultural diversity, economic status, and so on.  
Therefore, the Red Cross is aligning with certain diverse communities to support a more 
inclusive diverse response.  They see the need to recruit volunteers from minority 
populated areas in order to better serve these areas in the future.  Lastly, the Red Cross is 
changing their network structure to reach out to communities that have lost or have never 
had Red Cross services. 
2. Pentagon Attacks of 9/11 
The coordinated attacks of September 11 have set a standard of preparedness that 
was once unimaginable.  The 9/11 Commission cites that “our” biggest mistake was a 
lack of imagination that such an attack could occur.  The Virginia, Arlington County Fire 
Department (ACFD) was among the first emergency responders at the Pentagon site, and 
quickly assumed the responsibility of incident commander.  This terrorist attack is 
unique, more so than those at the World Trade Center earlier the same day, because of the 
multi-jurisdictions involved, the type of target selected, and the large numbers of 
agencies, volunteer organizations, and individuals from all levels of government that 
responded.  Although the attack occurred in Arlington, Virginia, the facility attacked 
belonged to the Department of Defense, also located in the vicinity of the nation’s 
capitol, Washington, DC, and which elicited an increased multi-government response, 
media attention, and unique considerations and requirements.  Nevertheless, the 9/11 
Pentagon attacks are often referred to as a successful model of the National Interagency 
Incident Management System (NIIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS), thus 
evoking what is generally said to be a successful multi-interagency emergency response. 
Ironically, the Washington area Council of Governments adopted the NIIMS ICS 
in March of 2001 and, although the ACFD performed well in responding to the terrorist 
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attack on the Pentagon, the actual experience of coordinating the multifaceted response 
proved significantly more challenging than previously envisioned.  To gain a better 
understanding of the events and in order to draw lessons learned, the ACFD conducted an 
After Action Report (AAR) compiled of countless debriefing sessions, extensive surveys, 
and general information collected from incident managers, victims, first responders, 
volunteers, and others that responded to the incident.  The following lessons learned are 
derived from the AFCD’s after action report. 
Establishing and maintaining command of the Pentagon attack response was 
extremely difficult and daunting.  The chaos at the Pentagon consisted of many people 
and equipment from multiple organizations from every level of government, volunteer 
organizations, and good-Samaritans arriving to help.  This posed several leadership 
challenges since the Arlington Fire Department usually consisted of only 260 uniformed 
personnel.   As large amounts of volunteers began to arrive and mingle, it created 
congestion at the scene.  The American Red Cross chapter had 80 trained volunteers at 
time of the incident; however close to 1,500 Red Cross volunteers showed up from 
surrounding chapters and the national headquarters, making it extremely difficult to 
control volunteer movement.59   Many agencies reported that the massive volumes of 
volunteer response overwhelmed them.  The ACFD acknowledged that it should 
strengthen its volunteer coordination to ensure personal capabilities are matched with 
potential response employment without interfering with official emergency organizations.  
The ACFD recommended that a central location with a single coordinator should 
coordinate and match certain skills sets with disaster requirements.  Standards should be 
established to quickly evaluate and classify volunteers wanting to help in emergency 
situations.  
The multi-agency response also complicated the situation.  The institutional 
dissimilarities, training, and agency-lingo differences created unfamiliar protocols which 
slowed the emergency response.  The military responders were unfamiliar with the ICS 
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and initially tended to operate unilaterally.60  ICS worked well for local responders, but 
the overall response was uncoordinated with the on-scene Incident Command.  Another 
challenge that was brought to light was the complicated management of the multiple 
communications systems.  Confusion among fire brigades and other response agencies 
stemmed from incompatible communications equipment.  Issues included different 
service providers, megahertz wattages, short-range versus long-range walkie-talkies, and 
other various inconsistencies, which led to confusion and incomplete or wrong 
information flow.  Vital information such as orders to evacuate a building or to block 
street intersections was not effectively communicated.  This same communication flaw 
was also evident the World Trade Center, Hurricane Katrina, and even during the recent 
Southern California fires. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined only some of the many volunteer emergency response 
capabilities and the challenges that each face during disasters.  While each organization 
offers unique response assets, it is entirely possible that there may be too many 
organizations.  One concerted effort may in fact effectively mitigate the challenges and 
coordinate volunteers in order to maximize a volunteer emergency response.  Since the 
mission of the Armed Forces and the Department of Homeland Security are both 
sensitive to national security, the same level of importance should be given to a DHS-
Reserve program as the DoD-Reserves.  The following chapter will compile the 
characteristics of current emergency response organizations and the lessons learned in 
this chapter in order to offer insight into what a potential DHS-Reserves organization 
could most likely look like. 
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III. THE PROPOSED DHS-RESERVES PROGRAM AND 
UNIFICATION OF EFFORTS 
Investing in education and training for homeland security course-work 
around the country is investing in a more secure future for America; these 
programs are vital in preparing the nation for dealing with all types of 
disasters. 
— DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that there are numerous disparate volunteer 
response efforts.  Since these efforts vary greatly in training and by region, this chapter 
will conceptualize and explore the idea of unifying such efforts under one federal 
umbrella.  Although the Department of Homeland Security already acts as a federal 
parent unit with its subordinate organizations, a DHS-Reserves program could vitalize a 
national volunteer movement while encouraging “homeland security” at the personal 
level and provide the nation with a national service system similar to those in other 
countries.  There are currently several members of Congress and the Senate advocating 
citizens to get involved in matters of homeland security and several members have 
already called for the development of a mandatory national service system.  Therefore, 
unifying some or all of the current volunteer organizations under one federal entity could 
enhance emergency response capabilities and coordination, while establishing a federal 
volunteer-service system.   
After the Pentagon attack, in which massive amounts of volunteers swarmed the 
incident, the ACFD recommended that a central location with a single coordinator should 
coordinate and match certain skills sets with disaster requirements.  Standards should be 
established to quickly evaluate and classify volunteers wanting to help in emergency 
situations.61  This chapter will conceptualize how a Department of Homeland Security-
Reserves could serve as a central coordinating entity and establish the above standards.  
Although, this chapter will not discuss specific details of such organization; it will 
discuss possible curriculums, standardized credentials, possible target audiences and the 
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capabilities it could provide.  Additionally, because this type of organization may place 
individuals in sensitive areas vital to national or homeland security, it would need to 
outline the type of individuals that could best fit such an organization.  A DHS-R may 
need to screen individuals to determine if they could be trusted in a homeland security 
environment.  Lastly, this chapter will investigate the types of incentives that would most 
likely generate participation and describe the types of assets that a concerted emergency 
response organization could offer to incident commanders and decision makers on the 
ground during a crisis. 
A. CURRICULUM AND STANDARDIZED TRAINING 
1. Existing Homeland Security Programs 
As the field of homeland security continues to evolve and define itself, it is 
important to establish a frame of reference in order to cast curriculums and training to 
build subject matter expertise.  By default, the Department of Homeland Security is the 
principal authority of this emerging field.  Although parallel organizations and related 
fields contribute to the study and practice of ‘homeland security,’ DHS via its Secretary 
and by direction of the President of United States, serves as the primary authority to 
synchronize homeland security education and training programs.   
Although DHS, FEMA, and Citizen Corps do not have a formal volunteer 
curriculum or training academy, they do provide various guidelines for emergency 
response training.  DHS has officially recognized the Community Emergency Response 
Team curriculum as a valid training resource and as a partner of Citizen Corps, however 
there are nearly 1,800 homeland security courses offered at over 227 schools 
nationwide.62  The evolving academic field of homeland security is in a “pre-paradigm 
phase as a professional discipline.”63  Therefore, it does not appear that the homeland 
security academic environment has matured to the point that common core requirements 
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are taught at any level of education.  The homeland security academic discipline is an 
evolving ungoverned process made up of a mixture of pre-9/11 courses and post-9/11 
lessons learned.  The Department of Homeland Security primarily outsources its 
education and training development system to other institutions and universities using 
broad national objectives and doctrines. 
The DHS Office of Grants and Training has established the Homeland Security 
National Training Program (HSNTP).  This program provides funding through 
cooperative and inter-agency agreements with the National Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium, Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and Continuing and Emerging 
training providers for the purposes of the development and delivery of all-hazards 
training for federal, state, local, and tribal emergency responders.  This program in 
conjunction with the Competitive Training Grant Program solicits applicants to design, 
develop and deliver training content in accordance with DHS doctrine guidance and 
approved national homeland security strategies.  This program awards funds to 
competitively selected applicants for innovative training programs that support training 
initiatives that are national in scope and further the DHS mission of preparing the nation 
to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism and 
catastrophic events.  Since its inception, the HSNTP has funded more than $521.5 million 
to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, national associations, higher education 
institutions, non-profit organizations, and the private sector.64  The Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security which has been awarded 
$15,700,00065 in DHS funding for a wide range of programs focusing on assisting leaders 
in Homeland Defense and Security to develop policies, strategies, and organizations 
needed for emergency preparedness and to defeat terrorism in the United States.  Since 
2002, NPS’s CHDS has developed a fully accredited Masters Degree program and the 
nation’s first and largest digital homeland security research library.    Given the CHDS’ 
time in the homeland security academic environment, its established homeland security 
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networks, the use of its graduate program as a model for other universities, and its 
collaboration with DHS, many institutions look to CHDS for guidance on homeland 
security academic issues, thus becoming the nation’s premier provider of homeland 
security graduate and executive level education.66 
The DHS University System is another educational program that was recently 
established to address training and education efforts for current DHS employees at 
various academic institutions nationwide.  It also offers grants to individuals who intend 
to work in homeland security-related fields.  Employees can attend both resident and non-
resident courses, distant learning, and independent study programs.  Some programs are 
web-based, while others are in-class.  Most of these courses are taught at the federal and 
state levels, while the CERT curriculums concentrate on local level responders.  Another 
type of curriculum that not only expands the homeland security paradigm, but also 
attempts to bridge a civil-military gap is the United States Military Academy’s newly 
established education-minor.  West Point has recently developed a minor in terrorism 
studies that encompasses homeland security courses.  This step is vital and ground 
breaking in that it teaches future military officers key components of homeland security 
that they can use as military responders or in support of civil authorities in an emergency 
disaster.  The West Point homeland security curriculum emphasizes key concepts and 
‘civilian’ strategies that many of the lessons learned highlighted that military responders 
were not familiar with.  Students are expected to learn about the National Response Plan, 
the National Incident Management System and Incident Command System, interagency 
processes, critical ‘homeland security’ infrastructures, the DHS organization, and 
homeland security budgetary and border security issues; all of which future military 
officers should be knowledgeable of, when encountering a homeland security/defense 
environment.  This curriculum helps bridge the gaps between military and civilian first 
responders and incident management. 
Therefore, it is very apparent that there is a plethora of homeland security 
academic and training programs.  Although there is not one defined or recognized 
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approved program, perhaps a hybrid of the current programs could establish an effective 
training foundation for volunteer first responders and recovery workers. 
2, Propose New Program of Study 
Instead of outsourcing homeland security education and training curriculums, 
DHS could establish a standardized approved curriculum or web-based academy for 
volunteer first responders.  A standard DHS volunteer curriculum could address the 
realities that confront the modern first responder and recovery worker.  It would need to 
prioritize the nation’s homeland security training requirements and objectives in order to 
equip its volunteers with the necessary learning objectives and tools to respond to an 
emergency in a hectic environment.   
During a recent Homeland Security exercise in Hawaii, volunteer medical 
professionals pointed out that there should be a standardized procedure and training on 
how to set up an Acute Care Unit (ACU), since the volunteers all came from different 
hospitals, had varied backgrounds and learned different methods of how to set up an 
ACU.  A DHS volunteer-academy could establish a baseline level of competency to 
eliminate confusion among volunteer responders.  It could also mature into a foundation 
that decision makers, incident commanders, and other homeland security leaders could 
become familiar with.  The curriculum could encompass the current core courses of 
CERT and also include the National Incident Management System, the Incident 
Command System, Fire and Search and Rescue, Basic First Aid, and the Standard 
Operating Procedures and administrative policies of a DHS-Reserves organization.  It 
could also include an advanced portion for those interested in advanced relevant training 
standards, like advanced life support, hazardous material awareness, terrorist threats, and 
Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) threats.  A DHS-
approved academy could establish a standardized curriculum for other emergency 
response agencies to follow. 
The curriculum itself could be administered to volunteers in a variety of methods.  
Although formal education and training requirements increase volunteer time demands 
and could become cumbersome, the courses could be web-based or by correspondence.  
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Volunteers in rural areas could conduct individual web-based training virtually anywhere 
from remote locations.  Those volunteers in populated areas could report to each state’s 
Office of Homeland Security as part of their monthly or annual training requirements.  
This type of formal education system could also establish competencies at various levels 
of training, thus categorizing or ranking each individual by the amount of training they 
have completed.  It is possible that an individual’s level of training, rank, and pay-grade 
could be displayed on a standard identification card.  As the homeland security discipline 
continues to mature, it is possible that a DHS-Reserve program could help to identify 
homeland security areas of focus that could shape program commonalities, core teaching 
areas, and standardize future homeland security curriculums and volunteer-academies.    
B. STANDARDIZED CREDENTIALS 
1. Eliminate Fraud and Identify Level of Competency 
A DHS-R program could also establish a national volunteer registry to track all 
volunteers, not only those in DHS, but those in other volunteer programs as well that 
could assist in an emergency.  This could lead to the establishment of a standardized 
credential system for emergency response volunteers that would be recognized across all 
levels of government during a disaster.  Currently, volunteer organizations are not 
required to issue identification cards.  Those that do issue them, are only recognized by 
the issuing authority, thus making volunteers obtain multiple credentials to access 
different areas or jurisdictions, which could result in the inconvenience and cost of 
obtaining multiple credentials.  Incident Commanders often stress the importance of 
strengthening access control points in secure areas.  Perhaps it would be wise to consider 
using biometric access control systems to verify identification of volunteer emergency 
responders, especially if not wearing a standard-issue uniform during a disaster.  
Notwithstanding the use of biometrics, it is still important and perhaps necessary to 
standardize a volunteer credential for first responders in order to mitigate the threat of 




chaotic disaster.  Therefore, creating a common identification credential that could be 
used and recognized by all levels of authority is essential for an effective and efficient 
emergency response. 
On September 11, first responders swarmed to the scenes of the terrorists attacks.  
As chaos ensued, incident commands had a difficult time ensuring only credentialed 
responders had access to the sensitive areas of the scene.  In the midst of fires, victim’s 
screams, and emergency response assets moving around, one firefighter at the Pentagon 
attacks wondered if a volunteer firefighter tee-shirt was the only required identification.67  
Arlington County Director of Emergency Management, Robert P. Griffin said “during 
our 9/11 response, we learned that secure credentialing of first responders is essential to 
being able to efficiently provide critical emergency services.”68   Arlington County 
realized after the Pentagon attacks that it should work with neighboring jurisdictions, 
other emergency response agencies and volunteer organizations to implement a uniform 
identification system.69  The report recommended that such a system could be initially 
used until a more comprehensible credential process is established for large scale 
emergencies.  Remarkably, nearly six years later, Arlington County has developed the 
nation’s first- first responder credential. 
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Figure 3.   Example of First Responder Authentication Credential (FRAC) 
 
The new first responder authentication ID cards manifested out of the First 
Responder Partnership Initiative, which includes the Department of Homeland Security 
(National Capital Region), the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), and the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  The Initiative itself grew out of the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), which outlines a policy to enhance security, 
increase government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by 
establishing a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of 
identification issued by the federal government to its employees and contractors.70  The 
new identification card, known as the First Responder Authentication Credentials or 
FRAC, closely resembles the Common Access Card (CAC) currently used by the 
Department of Defense.  The FRAC has been issued to more than 1,400 emergency 
services workers already.   These cards are each encoded with critical data that enables 
incident commanders at the scene of an emergency to authenticate the responder’s 
credentials by scanning the card’s internal content chip.  The card has the ability to 
securely maintain emergency responder’s privacy data, verify first responders’ 
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qualifications and specialized skills, and enhance cooperation between multiple-agencies.  
The new authentication cards revolutionize emergency management in that it allows 
incident commanders to match certain skill sets with vital jobs at the scene and properly 
track their whereabouts.  Virginia’s pilot program marks the first time that state and local 
emergency responders have received the federally approved credential across an entire 
county involving multiple Emergency Support Functions.71  
Another potential security threat stems from those individuals who work in secure 
areas in homeland security arenas.  According to the DHS and the Transportation 
Security Authority (TSA), many individuals that work in secure areas are currently not 
required to undergo a background check or a stringent identification process in order to 
access secure areas.72  Although TSA established the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) program in December 2001, it was not until Congress 
passed the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006, that it was 
directed to implement the TWIC program at the 10 highest risk ports.73  The TWIC 
program ensures that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed access to 
secure area of the nation’s transportation facilities.  Although this credential applies 
primary to workers within the TSA, the principles and characteristics of the TWIC 
program can be applied to a DHS-R standardized credential. 
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential was created to help protect 
transportation facilities from terrorist threats by issuing identification cards only to 
workers who do not pose a terrorist threat and allow these workers unescorted access to 
secure areas of the transportation system.  The TWIC program is ultimately intended to 
support all modes of transportation, however, TSA, in partnership with the Coast Guard, 
is focusing initial implementation in the maritime sector.  Therefore, TSA already began 
to enroll and issue ID cards to maritime workers in the TWIC program.  The estimated 
$70 million project is expected to enroll and credential 770,000 workers at 3,200 
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maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels.74  This is important to national and homeland 
security because of the implications that an attack on the transportation system could 
have.  The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach estimate that they alone handle 
approximately 43% of the nation’s oceanic cargo.  Therefore, any attack on such a large 
port would be costly.  A labor dispute in 2002 shut down West Coast port operations for 
10 days, totaling $1.5 billion in economic loss per day.75  A terrorist attack along the 
same lines could have the same, if not greater impact on the nation’s economy.   
The TWIC program itself enrolls workers by collecting personal information, 
including Social Security Number (SSN), address, photograph, and in some cases 
fingerprints.   The TWIC also conducts background checks to ensure individuals do not 
pose a security threat.  Lastly, TSA cross-checks each name with terrorism-watch lists, 
FBI’s criminal history records, and verifies workers’ immigration and mental capacity 
status.  This type of credential program will in fact make America’s ports and 
transportation mediums safer.  Preventing unauthorized people from entering secured 
environments is a necessary component of securing the homeland, especially during an 
emergency disaster response.  It is clear that DHS, TSA, and the Arlington County of 
Virginia have made progress toward credentialing emergency response workers and 
volunteers.  In accordance with HSPD-12, the SAFE Act and other legislative 
requirements and lessons learned, it is important to identify official and ‘non-official’ or 
volunteer emergency responders during a disaster.  Doing so, will contribute to an 
effective and coordination emergency response. 
C. TARGET AUDIENCE AND INCENTIVES 
This portion will outline the type of individuals and skill sets that can best serve 
the nation in a homeland security capacity.  The target audience for a federal volunteer 
response program could vary in age, skill and level of commitment.  It is necessary and 
important to match the right type of individuals to such an organization, because of its 
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importance to matters of national security.  Once screened, a national volunteer program 
would not only provide the nation with key assets, but also a sense of national pride for 
those who serve.  Since 9/11, individuals seem more willing to give their time to 
volunteer for emergency services organizations.  Although emergency services are the 
most demanding of volunteer activities, the experience is rewarding and the training 
requirements offer a personal sense of value.  In today’s chaotic world, a strong federal 
support for a volunteer organization is needed in order to legitimize it in the eyes of the 
public in order to make emergency services the organizations that will attract volunteers. 
It is important to create a system that introduces citizens at all levels of their 
education or career to the homeland security arena.  It is crucial to capitalize on 
individual skills and specialties that citizens already have.  In some cases, first responders 
such as police, doctors, and other professionals are willing to volunteer their time and 
unique specialties to an emergency response.  Although many first responders perform 
many life-saving duties on a daily basis, rarely, if ever, are all first responders called on 
to do their jobs at the same time on a massive scale that taxes all their resources.  
Therefore, it is essential to not only use the existing first responder resources, but also to 
develop new first responders or unify the current ones into a capable and reliable reserve 
volunteer response force. 
First responders, as the name implies, are those individuals who will respond 
“first” to any catastrophe, natural or man-made.  They are not only police officers and 
firefighters.  They are those who will assist others during crisis by restoring power or 
drinking water, giving first aid or live-saving medical attention, dispensing much needed 
pharmaceuticals, putting out fires, searching through rubble for bodies, evacuating 
victims, giving out meals, and bringing comfort to those in need.  For these reasons, first 
responders are critical in times of need and, as previously discussed in this thesis, their 
heroic efforts and selfless service save thousands of lives each year.  Finding the right 
people who are dependable and willing to serve as volunteers in a “first responder” 
capacity, therefore, is crucial to effectively respond to natural and man-made disasters.  It 
is also necessary to develop a quality incentive program in order to recruit and  
retain dedicated emergency service volunteers. 
 46
1. College Students and College Tuition/Loan Repayment 
Targeting college-age Americans is beneficial for many reasons.  Despite the fact 
that the majority are young, physically able, and available, most Americans who graduate 
high school are eager to get involved.  This resource would provide a large pool of people 
that is refreshed each year.  Not only would this effort educate young people about 
homeland security, but it could very well spark further interest in the subject for people to 
serve elsewhere in related capacities.  Focusing on college-age individuals would ensure 
a steady flow of capable recruits and offer longevity to a DHS-R program. 
The increase in tuition, population, and global economy has made college 
education a privilege for many Americans.  According to U.S. News and World Report, 
tuition rose 6 percent in 2006, which is clearly more than the national rate of inflation, 
income raises, or financial aid increase.  The report concludes that if prices keep rising at 
the current rate, students who do not receive financial aid will be required to pay close to 
$115,000 to earn their undergraduate degree, as opposed to thirty years ago, when the 
average tuition was closer to $12,000. 76  The average year at a private university is 
$33,000, and some exceed $50,000 a year.  Commuter schools, also known as two-year 
community colleges, are the best financial choice for most students; however, even if 
they live at home, their tuition still adds up to $8,000 a year.77  Clearly, higher education 
is quite costly. 
Notwithstanding these facts, higher education still pays.  The pay gap between 
those with a college education and those without continues to widen.  Therefore, despite 
the rising costs associated with a college education, Americans will continue to desire 
higher education. They will need alternate and more methods to finance it, however, most 
students find creative ways to pay for college and use several factors as leverage to earn 
financial aid.  A proposed Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could influence 
participants by helping to offset rising tuition costs, or reduce federal loans, in exchange 
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for volunteer service.  As students volunteer to serve in various capacities, they could 
earn financial aid credits toward tuition or loan repayment.  Volunteering for such an 
organization could also give students leverage to apply for certain federal loan programs 
or receive additional financial aid.  Offering to help students pay for college would not 
only encourage students to stay in school, but also encourage students to volunteer and 
serve the nation in a “homeland security” capacity. 
The nation’s selective service system also presents an option for participation.  
This system provides a vital and very important asset to the Armed Forces; however, it 
may be possible to share the asset while maintaining the same intention.  Currently, all 
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six are required to register for selective 
service.   The purpose of registration is so that the government can maintain a database of 
men from which to draw in case of a national emergency requiring rapid expansion of the 
Armed Forces, thus ensuring that a fair and equitable draft occurs if it is needed.78  As 
former President Clinton informed Congress on May 18, 1994, “ 
The Selective Service System and draft registration provides a hedge 
against unforeseen threats and a relatively low cost “insurance policy” 
against our underestimating the maximum level of threat… As fewer and 
fewer members of our society have direct military experience, it is 
increasingly important to maintain the link between the all-Volunteer 
Force and our society-at-large. 
Though a selective service draft has yet to be implemented, this illustrates the need to 
have a civilian volunteer force on stand by.  Failure to register for this program carries a 
penalty fine up to $250,000 and/or up to five years in jail.  Registration is also a 
requirement for federal student financial aid, job training, benefits, and most federal 
employment.   
The incentives for college-age Americans who are not enrolled in school nor have 
any intention to pursue a higher education could include monetary benefits for time 
served.  In addition to serving their nation, these individuals could receive additional 
training, volunteer to work more than one weekend a month for pay, and be among the 
                                                 
78 Selective Service website, http://www.sss.gov/Default.htm, accessed on October 20, 2007. 
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first to be activated for longer periods of time in the case of an emergency.  For many 
young Americans, a sense of responsibility is enough to captivate their attention and gain 
their participation.   
2. Military (Term and Retirees) and Availability to Finish Federal Term 
in DHS-R 
Another untapped resource for homeland security includes prior or retired military 
personnel.  As the war on terror continues to increase op-tempo, many service members 
are choosing the civilian sector over additional military terms, while others are choosing 
to retire.  The weight of the war has also increased the rate of divorce and the rate of 
Army desertion by 80%, since 2003.79  Furthermore, 54% of the West Point class of 2000 
has already left the Army, which is the lowest rate since 1977.80  Therefore, it is 
important to analyze the current trends and identify viable solutions to prevent long-term 
implications of a stretched-military and a failed volunteer-emergency response.  After all, 
military members are proud, talented, and are already dedicated to providing selfless-
service to the nation.  Most service members offer unique skills and talents beneficial to a 
DHS-R program.  Many of these men and women already posses relevant qualities, 
professional skills, a loyal sense of duty, security clearances and, in some cases, valuable 
emergency response experience and knowledge that can directly benefit DHS and future 
emergency responses.  According to Mr. John E. Stone, current President of the U.S. 
Freedom Foundation, “there are lots of well-trained military that we aren’t using; they 
aren’t in it for the money.”81 Therefore, creating an opportunity for military members to 
transition to DHS could prove to be a symbiotic relationship, improving the DHS 
organization, while alleviating some of the military’s societal pressures.   
The current policy allows military personnel to carry-over their federal service 
toward the retirement timeline of any subsequent federal government agency; however, 
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there are no formal agreements, and each individual must re-apply to a new federal 
organization.  The current system almost dis-incentivizes military retirees from working 
in another federal organization by preventing military retirees from using their military 
time toward earning vacation days in the government service (GS) system.    Perhaps an 
official agreement between DoD and DHS could facilitate a formal transition amongst 
federal employees that would allow active duty personnel the opportunity to transition 
their federal service to the Department of Homeland Security or to continue their service 
in a DHS-Reserves capacity.  Creating the opportunity for military members to serve out 
their federal term as a DHS-reservist, as opposed to a military-reservist can also lead to a 
highly skilled citizen reserve corps ready to respond to domestic emergencies.  However, 
until a formal agreement is achieved, DHS should specifically recruit military personnel 
that are transitioning out, or retiring from, the military for specific homeland security 
purposes.   
A creative opportunity to attract military members to DHS or a DHS-Reserves is 
to review the current military retirement system.  Leaders must realize that the military 
retirement systems may be outdated and perhaps counterproductive to the retention of 
current members and the recruitment of future ones.  Although it would not be wise to 
make the Department of Homeland Security the scapegoat agency that military members 
go to, to escape further military service, it would be beneficial to review possible 
methods to allow some members of the armed forces to continue their federal term in a 
DHS or DHS-R capacity.  As America continues to rely heavily on both active duty and 
reservists to meet increased operational requirements, studies have shown that both junior 
officers and enlisted personnel are less inclined to re-enlist for future service or stay until 
retirement, thus justifying a fresh review of the current military retirement system.82  The 
current retirement system for active duty personnel is an all-or-nothing system that 
requires no less than twenty years for retirement.  Military reservist are the only federal 
employees who must reach the age of sixty to draw their retirement pay and benefits, 
even if they complete their military service before turning sixty.  Additionally, the 
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increased pace of operations has added a severe amount of pressure on the military, 
which begs the creation of a more flexible system that could allow military members to 
easily move between DoD and DHS organizations.  Creating a diverse and flexible 
retirement system could increase retention and recruitment for both DoD and DHS 
employees.   
A more flexible federal environment could in fact allow military service members 
to complete an initial or second term in the respective DoD-service and then apply to the 
Department of Homeland Security to complete their federal service term, thus carrying 
over their military service time to DHS.  They could apply for either full time or part-
time DHS positions in which they could work one-weekend a month, complementary to a 
DoD-Reservist.  It is entirely possible that military members could serve DHS in the 
same or similar capacity of their military specialty occupation.  Another benefit which 
has been highlighted in many of the lessons learned is that military members could 
integrate the DoD culture and lingo into a DHS organization, thus bridging the civil-
military gap, which is beneficial during a DHS volunteer emergency response. 
3. Specialty Skilled Employees   
In general, people are more trusting of experts in a given field, such as doctors 
and first responders, over elected officials or government administrators.  Therefore, 
using these experts to response to the public’s needs during a crisis can be critical to 
saving lives.  Currently, some volunteer organizations are dedicated to specific technical 
or trade-specific tasks.  For instance, the Disaster Medical Association Teams (DMAT) 
of Hawaii is a state organization of medical professionals who volunteer their time, effort 
and specialty to the state of Hawaii during disasters.  Similarly, the Medical Reserve 
Corps (MRC), which is a partner of Citizen Corps, is a federal organization dedicated to 
organizing local health and medical volunteers to prepare for and respond to emergency 
disasters.  These types of specialty volunteer organizations enlist medical professionals to 
donate their time and expertise as a supplement to existing emergency and public health 
resources.  Both the DMAT and MRC volunteers include medical and public health 
professionals such as physicians, surgeons, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, 
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and epidemiologists.  Undoubtedly, these types of volunteer organizations fill key 
positions during large-scale emergency disasters. 
Therefore, a potential DHS-Reserve program should target key specialties that 
could supplement emergency workers during times of crises.  The incident command 
system could integrate the DHS-Reserves as part of the planning process and triage of the 
incident.  Since most of the specialty-qualified DHS-Reservists could be used as initial 
responders and for recovery efforts, they would play an even more important role.  Well 
after the immediate devastation of 9/11 and Katrina, victims were in dire need of 
monetary, physical, emotional, and psychological help.   
The most common professions that would be needed to volunteer for DHS-
Reserves include police, fire, medical, mental and emotional health counselors, 
construction workers, language interpreters, public health officials, critical infrastructure 
analysts, engineers, and disaster mitigation specialists.  These professions are vital during 
an emergency response and recovery.  The Incident Command Management System 
could train and familiarize its members with the various capabilities and specialties of the 
DHS-Reserves.  Having specialty response volunteers at the Incident Commander’s 
disposal could lead to a more effective government response while mitigating unforeseen 
collateral damages. 
The aftermath of natural and man-made disasters require as much coordination, 
resources, and volunteers as the disasters themselves.  Many of the displaced victims 
from Katrina were housed in the Louisiana Superdome.  According to Major General 
Bennett C. Landreneau, the Adjutant General for the Louisiana National Guard, the 
Superdome provided shelter for nearly 25,000 Katrina victims.  The scenario at the 
Superdome required professional assistance across multiple spectrums in which DHS-
Reservists could have filled.  Many victims everywhere, not just at the Superdome, 
needed mental and emotional counselors to help them cope with the loss of their 
belongings, their traumatic struggles, and in some cases, grieve the loss of loved ones.  
Additionally, public health officials were needed to educate people of possible 
containments and to access the living situation inside the Superdome, where large 
populations were forced to cohabitate in an enclosed environment with limited resources.  
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Conditions at the stadium had become horrendous: there was no air conditioning, the 
toilets were backed up, and the stench was so bad that medical workers wore masks.  In 
Mississippi, bodies were starting to pile up at a local morgue.83  Additional police were 
needed, not only to restore law and order on the streets of New Orleans, but also inside 
the Superdome.  Officials set up security check points at the Superdome entrances and 
confiscated alcohol, weapons, and illegal drugs from those evacuees seeking shelter.  
Evacuees also stole furniture and damaged stadium property causing thousands of dollars 
in damages.  In this case, DHS-Reservists who are qualified peace officers in other 
jurisdictions could have helped to quell civil disturbances and perhaps added efficiency to 
the recovery efforts, in addition to saving lives.  Specialty Reservists offer unique 
capabilities to unforeseen circumstances and are sometimes desperately needed during 
national emergencies, thus making their participation in a DHS-R program essential. 
The incentives and compensations for volunteer-professionals would need to be 
substantive in order to recruit and maintain an acceptable number of professional 
volunteers.  Financial compensations could exist in various forms.  DHS could offer 
Reservists monetary benefits comparable to their professions when activated during 
emergency disasters.  Although the nation could require key specialties to serve a 
mandatory term as part of a national service system, it would be more welcomed by 
professionals to volunteer their capabilities on their own accord.  For instance, DHS 
could provide tuition assistance to medical students during college and ask for a 
predetermined number of reserve-time as collateral once they receive their MDs.  DHS 
may also be able to grant selective service credit to those professionals who enlist their 
services after their schooling.  Another incentive could be for DHS to pay for 
certifications, such as police and fire academies, apprentice programs, and other 
qualification-based professions in return for reserve duty.  DHS could also ensure 
employee protection rights, similar to those offered to the National Guard, for those 
DHS-Reservists activated for longer periods of time.  Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, DHS could offer a sense of national pride and selfless service to those 
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volunteer-professionals who do not already experience this in their current occupations.  
Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security should actively seek volunteer 
“reservists” with special talents to increase the range of services and skills it can offer 
during an emergency response. 
 
 Summarized Benefits/Incentives: 
 
Tax Credit    Selective-Service Credit 
College Tuition Assistance College Loan-repayment 
Professional School tuition Reduced Home Mortgage interest rate 
Credit Union   Waive certain federal fees 
Health Care    Service Longevity program 
Reduced/Credit utility bill Private/Business supporting tax credit 
DHS membership privileges Sense of Nationalism 
Reduced Airport wait time Employment protection rights 
Various DHS/EMS/First Responder Certifications 
 
D. CONCERTED EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CAPABILITIES 
1. The Conceptual Model  
An independent and re-invigorated DHS-Reserve organization would be well 
positioned to integrate and coordinate other emergency-response organizations into a 
new, more effective response network that works directly with federal entities and their 
counterparts at the state, local, and private levels.  Volunteer emergency response 
organizations, as currently constituted, are composed of too many disparate entities.  
DHS should have the capacity to integrate various streams of volunteer organizations for 
the purposes of responding to local or large-scale emergencies.  A DHS-R organization 
would address the vital weaknesses in emergency response operations.  Having a pool of 
readily available skilled, trained, security cleared and capable personnel to meet 
emergency contingency needs at a considerably lower cost is perhaps the best way to fill 
current volunteer emergency response gaps, while energizing the American public’s 
interest to serve its nation. 
The conceptual model could resemble many of the existing volunteer 
organizations, with the administrative and employment policies similar to that of the 
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National Guard, since its serves as the DoD’s reserve entity.  Another example that a 
DHS-Reserve organization could model is the State Defense Forces that played a vital 
role in U.S. homeland security during World War II as a back up to the National Guard.  
Although this organization has lost creditability and stature, it was once fully supported 
by the Roosevelt Administration, Congress, and the War Department.84  A DHS-reservist 
could similarly be required to attend a basic training drill monthly and annually, and 
receive pay only if activated.  In my view, a DHS-Reserve capability could provide large 
numbers of organized, disciplined, trained, and uniformed civilian volunteers to augment 
emergency responders, police, National Guard, and federal agencies in anticipation of 
and in response to catastrophic emergencies. 
Once such a model is established, the role of these homeland security-reservists 
could take on a variety of responsibilities, perhaps even allowing volunteers to augment 
and participate in one of the twenty-two sub-agencies under the DHS umbrella.  After 
each reservist completed basic web-based or correspondence training, he or she could 
volunteer to take additional homeland security “qualifier” courses so that each could be 
employed in more “official” capacities with increased responsibilities.  Monthly and 
annual training requirements could consist of emergency response scenario training, 
large-scale homeland security exercises, individual job-focused training, and other 
homeland security-focused training.  This program could also train incident commanders 
to handle large amounts of volunteers and employ them prior to a real-world event, thus 
familiarizing all personnel to the Incident Command System.  DHS-reservists could also 
be required to work one weekend each month in addition to their annual training 
requirement at one of DHS’s twenty-two subordinate agencies.   Similar to the military-
reserves who perform their specialty near their home on their respective weekend, so can 
DHS-Reservists, perhaps at each state’s Office of Homeland Security.  DHS-reservists 
could perform TSA-type duties at their local airports, thus filling a gap or allowing full-
time TSA employees time off.  Other weekend duties could include border and port 
access points, random anti-terrorist measures, multi-level emergency response training 
exercises, and other DHS-related duties.   
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Alerting DHS-reservists could happen several ways using multiple media and 
networks.  An established federal reserve program would have an existing database of 
capable trained volunteers.  Despite a low level of public trust in the media, the television 
is the primary choice for crisis information; therefore, using the national media to alert 
DHS-Reservists is a viable plan.  Since each reservists will essentially have a duty 
description, level of training, and credential, a public announcement would be able to 
categorize the type and number of reservists needed and alert them of when, where, and 
how to report to an emergency disaster scene.  Incident Commanders could relay their 
triaged-requirements, so that overages of unneeded volunteers do not crowd the incident 
scene.  Using the media to alert volunteer emergency and recovery responders would 
facilitate and efficient and organized large-scale response. 
Once activated, trained DHS-reservists could begin emergency response 
operations.  Immediately after the attacks on 9/11 the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) grounded all airlines in order to reserve all airspace for emergencies.  If another 
emergency disaster of this scale were to take place, in which a large number of volunteers 
are needed at a specific location, a DHS-R system would be most beneficial.  As stated in 
the 9/11 Commission report and earlier in this thesis, one of the biggest failures of 9/11 
was “a lack of imagination.” Therefore, creating a DHS-Reserve may one day be 
necessary to cope with future natural or man-made disasters.  A scenario could possibly 
require thousands of DHS-Reservists to respond from across the nation.  These 
volunteers would range in specialties from manual labor first responders to medical 
physicians, police, and fire officials.  The incident commander would already be familiar 
with the DHS-Reserve system and its capabilities, and therefore could begin to triage his 
requirements to determine what specialties and how many of them are needed.  Once 
DHS-Reservists were alerted via public media, they could immediately proceed to their 
local airports using their credentials to board flights bound for the incident.  Through 
prior DHS coordination and FAA approval, airlines could begin to transport DHS-
Reservists to the closest airport near the incident.  This type of massive coordinated 
response could fill much needed positions and save thousands of lives during a national  
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emergency.  Although these types of emergencies are not a common occurrence, the 
same type of notification process could take place for local emergencies on a much 
smaller scale. 
2. Federal Assets Available to All levels of Government 
Unifying the emergency response volunteer efforts would not only enlist national 
support, but also create a conduit for integrating volunteer emergency responders and to 
coordinate with state, local, and private sector counterparts.  A DHS-Reserve 
organization could also circumvent some of the procedural problems that volunteer 
organizations currently experience such as proper notification, administrative and 
logistical issues, coordinating a multi-level response, standardized training and credential 
requirements, and post-deployment support.  As the nexus for volunteer emergency 
responders, it could disseminate instructions, regulate policies, coordinate program 
activities, match volunteer skills with disaster needs, and ensure accurate and complete 
record keeping.  Lastly, a DHS-Reserve organization would be able to effectively 
compile a list of DHS and other agency volunteers willing to provide disaster response 
and relief efforts and categorize such list by skills, specific knowledge and abilities, and 
relevant training.  Therefore, not only should DHS become the conduit to the various 
volunteer emergency organizations, but it should also act as the volunteer nexus where 
state and local agencies can access broader and larger assets at the national level- thus 
eliminating procedural obstacles, alleviating increased DOD domestic responsibilities, 
and perhaps initiating a national volunteer-service system.   
As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
recovery operations are extensive and manpower intensive.  They are also multi-
dimensional in coordinating several jurisdictional agencies and resources.  Trained 
volunteers provide the manpower needed to allow official agencies to concentrate on 
other critical areas.  Therefore, a trained volunteer force offers a broader base of valuable 
resources critical to emergency response operations.  This is important for two reasons.  
First, during Hurricane Katrina, the state of Maryland allowed state employees to 
volunteer in the recovery efforts; however, it stipulated that residents could volunteer 
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only for the Red Cross, and for only two weeks.  Although the state’s generosity is 
commendable, and the Red Cross is a valuable organization, this limited the volunteers to 
only one organization for only two weeks.  A federal-level volunteer organization, under 
the Department of Homeland Security, could ensure that disaster volunteers’ right are 
protected for more than two weeks.  Second, the County of Los Angeles alone has over 
eighty-eight cities, covers over four thousand miles, and there are over one hundred 
thirty-five languages spoken at home.85  Clearly, this is a huge challenge for any local 
jurisdiction with a diverse populous; especially during an emergency to communicate 
with insular communities that only speak their native tongue.  Los Angeles and most 
other large counties do not have the financial or staff resources to translate every 
language.  A federal-based support would ensure that the adequate foreign-language 
capabilities exist and are available to mobilize to disasters.  This is very important, 
especially since some of lessons learned from Katrina discussed how certain diverse 
populations were not able to communicate with first responders.  Language translation is 
very time-consuming and could severely hinder an effective and timely response. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The employer and student demand has created a desire for many schools to see 
the patriotic and financial practicality of establishing homeland security programs to meet 
the needs of current and future security issues.  This chapter has explored the concept of a 
homeland security-reserve using existing volunteer training curriculums, investigating 
possible population pools, incentives, and capabilities.  The homeland security discipline 
is currently a conglomerate of numerous academic and homeland security-related 
institutions trying to define and refine homeland security as a phenomenon.  Furthermore, 
since 9/11, America continues to witness an increase in volunteerism, which has created a 
wide variety of dispersed volunteer organizations.  A newly developed DHS-R could, 
more-or-less, integrate these multiple organizations creating a seamless network of 
volunteer emergency responders, linking the various levels of brave volunteers into a 
coherent whole, thus serving America well. 
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Although the National Guard and various disparate volunteer organizations 
currently have the responsibility of responding to emergency disasters, the possibility of 
National Guard personnel and equipment being inaccessible to state governors is a valid 
and growing concern.  Additionally, world events, military op-tempo trends, and the 
desire for Americans to serve their nation, presents the perfect opportunity to establish a 
national volunteer-reserve force that could double as the nation’s mandatory service 
system, while at the same time increasing the sense of national pride.   
A fully integrated, nation-wide volunteer reserve force would not only establish 
strong ties with local and state governments, but also become well suited to provide 
governors with the support and expertise for civil, military, and homeland security 
contingencies, which is desperately needed in the post-9/11 era.  The increase in 
asymmetric methods of warfare challenges the homeland security communities to review 
existing force structures to meet the evolving domestic security requirements.  Unifying 
current volunteer organizations into one federal, synchronized entity, such as DHS, 
represents a step in the right direction. 
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Today’s national domestic challenges are daunting.  In addition to the conflict in 
Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban, domestic threats also continue to grow.  Warning 
signs that the global terrorist networks have infiltrated the U.S., as well as the ongoing 
natural disasters, pose new types of domestic challenges.  The federal responses, or lack 
thereof, to large-scale man-made and natural disasters make it easy to understand why 
Americans feel uncertainty about domestic threats.  Post-Katrina assessments highlight 
that the response to Hurricane Katrina has tarnished DHS and FEMA’s image,  and 
Americans question their government’s ability to respond effectively to a disaster.  
Therefore, any subsequent failed disaster responses could further influence the American 
public’s confidence in the government. 
Even though our nation lacks a competently trained civilian reserve force, the 
United States has a history of rising to meet even the most daunting challenges, which is 
precisely why our nation must take advantage of the wellspring of volunteers who 
bravely come forward to help in times of crises.  The unconstrained and largely 
uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, coupled with the lack of a national 
governing body or oversight mechanism, are among the primary reasons for this thesis.  
Following one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, “to emphasize the 
importance of first responder training and prior joint planning,” the Homeland Security 
community should reorganize and synchronize the volunteer emergency response system 
for a post-9/11 world. 
The events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and other local and national emergencies 
have generated great interest — across a wide spectrum of cultures, ages, skills, and 
professions — in the field of homeland security.  Combining these interests with the 
organizations identified in this thesis, could create a solid unity of effort.  Such an effort 
could double as a national volunteer service system and also as an effective emergency 
response asset.  The federal government should make every effort to capitalize on these 
valuable resources, especially since the threats are changing and the environment is 
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becoming more dynamic.  Prior to 9/11, almost all emergency drills and exercises 
consisted of natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, or earthquakes. Now, 
however, terrorist attacks, power outages, and chemical and biological scenarios are 
included.   
This thesis has investigated the existing volunteer emergency response assets and 
has highlighted some of the inherent weaknesses of the current system.  To date, there is 
no official federal volunteer force.  Furthermore, neither homeland security organizations 
nor the academic community has reached a consensus on what constitutes the “official” 
homeland security reserve force.  Rather than ill-equipped and untrained volunteers, and 
in the absence of a governing or accrediting body to regulate emergency response 
education, it is extremely important to establish or unify a legitimate volunteer reserve 
organization. DHS now employs an estimated 180,000 people; however, over 40% of the 
federal workforce entered service since 9/11, which projects a significant number of 
homeland security-trained employees retiring over the next decade.86  With these 
numbers in mind, it is now more important than ever to establish a Department of 
Homeland Security-Reserve force, trained and ready to respond to disaster emergencies 
and to fill critical DHS response and recovery gaps, especially since the number of 
national disasters has remained steady over the past five years.  The table below further 
illustrates this trend. 
                                                 
86 Rollins, “The Homeland Security Academic Environment,” 17-18. 
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Table 4.   Five-year trend of natural disasters in the U.S. (From 87). 
 
Numerous volunteer organizations are offering support to the United States in one 
form or another.  In addition to the President’s USA Freedom Corps, there are numerous 
and disparate volunteer emergency response agencies. One recurring theme during this 
research, however, is that many government and volunteer agencies had varying degrees 
of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities within the homeland security 
umbrella — and specifically under the National Response Plan and the National Incident 
Management System.  Although each organization promotes volunteerism and service 
nationwide, none of these organizations performs what a Department of Homeland 
Security-Reserves Corps could provide.  Though the various volunteer corps offers 
significant selfless service to the nation, a DHS-Reserve could provide trained volunteers 
as part of a coordinated emergency response and perhaps provide the nation with a 
national service system, similar to those in other countries, to increase national pride. The 
                                                 
87 “America’s Disasters 2004; meeting the challenge,” 
http://www.redcross.org/pubs/dspubs/amdisasters2004.pdf, accessed on October 27, 2007, 9. 
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concept of using volunteers who are paid only when activated to an emergency response 
is entirely different than maintaining a full-time, budgeted organization. 
Therefore, volunteer emergency services are an extremely valuable national 
resource, saving taxpayers billions of dollars annually.  Given America’s uncertain 
security situation — and the ongoing strains on active duty, reserve, and the National 
Guard — a homeland security volunteer reserve force should receive greater support and 
relevance; they can provide domestic security at a relatively low cost while alleviating 
the reliance of a military response.  A DHS-Reserve would operate at a fraction of the 
cost, and would eliminate having to pay unnecessary costs associated with unprepared 
and overwhelming requests.  For instance, during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA issued 
mission assignments to more than twenty federal agencies.  These agencies became 
overwhelmed and called for federal employees to volunteer from other regions, which 
cost FEMA between $2,000 and $2 million per agency for overtime, travel, and per diem 
for each volunteer.88  Using volunteers to complete the same tasks would save an 
enormous amount of money.  In fact, according to an Independent Sector research report, 
the 2006 estimated average dollar value of volunteer time across the United States is 
$18.77 per hour.89  Additionally, between September 2001 and September 2002, 
approximately 59 million Americans, or 27.6 % of the non-institutional public, performed 
volunteer service.90  These numbers clearly demonstrate the beneficial costs of using 
volunteers and suggest that the American public is paying attention to President Bush’s 
national plea for Americans to take an active role in shaping their homeland security 
environment by volunteering.  It is imperative that the nation realize the rising costs of 
homeland security and take advantage of the semi-patriotic fervor that has inspired a 
wellspring of volunteers toward national service. This is especially important since these 
forces are paid only when activated for a real-world emergency, saving not only lives, but 
also thousands, if not millions, of dollars. 
                                                 
88 Skinner “FEMA’s Volunteer Service Program following Hurricane Katrina,” 1. 
89 Independent Sector report, 
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/volunteer_time.html. accessed on July 11, 2007, 1. 
90 Stephanie Boraas, “Volunteerism in the United States,” Monthly Labor Review, August 2003, 3. 
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Today’s situation is that there is no unity among our volunteer emergency 
response organizations.  There is no clear leadership or clear line of authority, until a 
disaster strikes, in which the first to arrive at an emergency scene is the first to serve as 
the incident commander.  Additionally, the federal government struggles to integrate 
military and non-military instruments into effective emergency response operations.  
These inadequacies in emergency response operations, along with the over-exhausted and 
ill-equipped troops at home, clearly present the need for America to consider expanding 
the opportunities for citizen service.  The federal government cannot wait until the next 
terrorist attack or natural disaster, or the next major war, to fill domestic emergency 
response gaps.  America must fundamentally transform its civilian capabilities by 
establishing a strategic civilian reserve corps that is qualified, flexible, and task-based.   
A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could address these emergency 
response fallacies by dedicating itself as the primary volunteer response force.  Each 
reservist would be familiar with his or her role and responsibility within the homeland 
security umbrella, understand the incident command system, and be trained in a specific 
job in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.   In fact, the Bipartisan Committee that 
investigated Hurricane Katrina concluded that DHS and individual states were not 
prepared for the severity of Katrina.  The report specifically acknowledged that 
Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to 
respond to the catastrophic effects…DHS and FEMA lacked adequate 
trained and experienced staff for a Katrina response, and that, the 
readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams was inadequate 
and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.91 
A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves would solidify its role at the 
federal level and build the organizational capacity to partner with state and local 
emergency managers, as well as foster relationships with local government leaders and 
other nonprofit and faith-based partners in the community.  A DHS-reserve organization 
would not only serve communities in need, but also provide the resources to successfully 
engage community leaders and build on existing networks.  Such a federal organization 
                                                 
91 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 3. 
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could also outreach to remote or often ignored communities while continuing to foster the 
existing DHS collaboration, education, and access among volunteer organizations.  
Lastly, a legitimate federal volunteer organization would also demonstrate the 
commitment from various government leaders within DHS.  Drawing on the assets of 
civil society enables a DHS-R program to tap into a wider range of skills sets and 
capacities than currently available at the National Guard and other current volunteer 
programs.  The fact that a DHS-R program would enlist, train, and employ locals from 
the same communities would have a dramatic effect among the respective communities, 
while providing them with an expandable force when needed, especially in the absence of 
the National Guard.  Therefore, enacting an emergency response volunteer system that is 
part of a national service system is the best way to involve Americans in homeland 
security.  Such a program, with a federal level of legitimacy and incentives, would attract 
the next generation of recruits for the nation’s volunteer emergency service organization.   
In addition to the many benefits presented in this thesis, there are several 
unintended benefits to creating a Homeland Security-reserve corps.  Expanding the 
opportunities for young civilians across the nation to serve in a homeland security 
capacity introduces broad ethnic groups to the American culture by involving them in 
domestic security, thus lessening the impact of alienating and perhaps radicalizing these 
groups of individuals, who may otherwise be prone to terrorism or criminal activity.  
Undoubtedly, these civilian volunteers also bring great value to the private sectors.  The 
costs of homeland security are inevitably felt by private industries in which airlines, 
realtors, industrial and energy sources, and private conglomerates bear the brunt of 
natural or man-made disasters.  It is, therefore, important to identify and establish 
Corporate Partnerships designed to engage corporate employees as DHS-R volunteers 
who are trained, ready, and willing to respond to local disasters. Each disaster directly 
affects profit margins as the economy witnesses a downturn; as a result, the private sector 
is forced to hire more security, invest in surveillance cameras and software packages, 
smart ID cards, perimeter fencing, and so on.  Therefore, if employees are better prepared 
at home and work, a company is better prepared for an emergency, thus inadvertently 
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making the private sector more stable.  A DHS-R could, in fact, bridge cultural diversity 
gaps and enhance the private sector’s homeland security awareness and security. 
Though the new generation of domestic challenges may seem daunting, we must 
adapt and transform our volunteer response assets and capabilities to confront these 
challenges.  At a time of unprecedented hazards within the United States, a homeland 
security reserve force is even more important to the overall domestic security.  Meeting 
these dynamic challenges is difficult in itself and will require sacrifices from the 
American people.  It is essential to domestic security to establish a civilian volunteer 
reserve force to supplement full-time emergency responders and also to fill first-
responder shortages.  Congress and future administrations must expand the opportunities 
for civilians to perform a national service by developing a new kind of civilian National 
Guard that serves exclusively in a domestic capacity.  Establishing a domestic civilian 
response corps at the federal level can greatly enhance emergency response assets at all 
jurisdictional levels.  A federal chartered volunteer organization ensures equitable 
education and monetary incentives, as well as enhanced training opportunities for reserve 
personnel.  Therefore, America cannot afford to remain mired in the past.  A Department 
of Homeland Security-Reserves could not only serve as a national service system, but 
also unify existing volunteer response and recovery assets and alleviate the increased 
DoD role in Homeland Security; only then, will DHS and FEMA begin to regain the 
public’s confidence. 
This thesis concludes that it is necessary to form or unify a citizen volunteer 
reserve force to assist in emergencies.  A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves, 
comprised of properly trained individuals, could effectively fill the emergency response 
gap, especially in the absence of deployed National Guard and active-duty military 
forces.  America can, and should, unify the disparate volunteer organizations that are 
willing to assist in emergency disasters.  Such unity of effort would combine existing 
federal, state, and local resources under one synchronized federal department available to 




the event of a man-made or natural disaster.  Therefore, developing a Department of 
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